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PREDICTIVE CONTRACTING
Spencer Williams*
This Article examines how contract drafters can use data
on contract outcomes to inform contract design. Building on
recent developments in contract data collection and analysis,
the Article proposes “predictive contracting,” a new method of
contracting in which contract drafters can design contracts
using a technology system that helps predict the connections
between contract terms and outcomes. Predictive contracting
will be powered by machine learning and draw on contract
data obtained from integrated contract management systems,
natural language processing, and computable contracts. The
Article makes both theoretical and practical contributions to
the contracts literature. On a theoretical level, predictive
contracting can lead to greater customization, increased
innovation, more complete contract design, more effective
balancing of front-end and back-end costs, better risk
assessment and allocation, and more accurate term pricing for
negotiation. On a practical level, predictive contracting has the
potential to significantly alter the role of transactional lawyers
by providing them with access to previously unavailable
information on the statistical connections between contract
terms and outcomes. In addition to these theoretical and
practical contributions, the Article also anticipates and
addresses limitations and risks of predictive contracting,
including technical constraints, concerns regarding data
privacy and confidentiality, the regulation of the unauthorized
practice of law and the potential for exacerbating information
inequality.
* Fellow and Lecturer in Law, Stanford Law School Program on
Corporate Governance and Practice. The author would like to thank Afra
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INTRODUCTION

This Article examines how contract drafters can use data
on contract outcomes1 to inform contract design.2 Building on
recent developments in contract data collection and analysis,
the Article proposes “predictive contracting,” a new method of
contracting in which contract drafters can design contracts
using a technology system that helps predict the connections
between contract terms and outcomes.
On July 25, 2018, the major technology company
Qualcomm announced that it was walking away from its $44
billion acquisition of NXP Semiconductors.3 Qualcomm and
NXP had been working on closing the acquisition for almost
two years.4 Qualcomm finally decided to terminate the deal
after failing to receive regulatory approval from China. 5 Yet
despite Qualcomm’s best efforts to close the deal, 6 it did not
1 This Article uses the term “contract outcomes” to refer to a broad set
of outcomes that can be used to assess a contract’s performance. This
includes outcomes such as whether the contract resulted in litigation, the
quality and timing of counterparty performance, how much the contract cost
to draft and administer, etc. For a discussion of contract outcomes, see infra
Section III.B.2.
2 This Article uses the term “contract design” to collectively refer to the
set of terms that make up a contract. See Albert Choi & George Triantis,
The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665,
1665–69 (2012); Spencer Williams, Venture Capital Contract Design: An
Empirical Analysis of the Connection Between Bargaining Power and
Venture Financing Contract Terms, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 105, 106–
07 (2017).
3 See Don Clark, Qualcomm Scraps $44 Billion NXP Deal After China
Inaction, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/07/25/technology/qualcomm-nxp-china-deadline.html [https://perma.
cc/8D52-7JLT].
4 See Chad Bray & Quentin Hardy, Qualcomm to Acquire NXP
Semiconductors for $38.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/business/dealbook/qualcommacquire-nxp-semiconductors.html [https://perma.cc/7RDX-T85D].
5 See Clark, supra note 3.
6 The CEOs of Qualcomm and NXP even exchanged text messages
thanking each other for their work on the deal despite the end result. See
Stu Woo, “I’m Sorry”: Qualcomm and NXP Chiefs Lament Failed Deal Via
Texts, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/qualcomm-
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get to walk away for free.7 Instead, it was forced to pay NXP
a termination fee of $2 billion under a breakup provision in
the acquisition agreement.8
As the breakup provision in the Qualcomm-NXP example
highlights, contract terms can have significant effects on
outcomes for the parties involved. This is the case in businessto-business contracts and business-to-consumer contracts.9
For example, experimental evidence suggests that transfer
provisions in mortgage contracts can increase the likelihood
of homeowners engaging in strategic default10 and that
parties are more likely to exploit efficient-breach
opportunities if the contract contains a liquidated damages
clause.11 In addition, empirical results show that anti-dilution
mechanisms in venture capital contracts can alter the division
of control between entrepreneurs and investors 12 and that
earnout clauses in complex acquisition agreements can have

deal-collapse-forces-nxp-to-forge-a-new-path-1532600411 (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review).
7 See Clark, supra note 3.
8 Id.
9 While this Article focuses primarily on business-to-business
contracts, it also highlights some important issues unique to business-toconsumer contracts. For a categorization of contracts along these lines, see
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) (breaking contracts down into
four categories based on whether the parties are businesses and/or
individuals).
10 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The
Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547, 1573–74
(2011).
11 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage
Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 633–38 (2010).
12 Robert E. Hall & Susan E. Woodward, The Incentives to Start New
Companies: Evidence from Venture Capital 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 13056, 2007) (finding that “[d]own-round
anti-dilution provisions shift venture ownership upward and non-venture
(entrepreneurs, angels, and employees) downward by an average of 4.8
percentage points”). For a discussion of anti-dilution provisions, see Michael
A. Woronoff & Jonathan A. Rosen, Understanding Anti-Dilution Provisions
in Convertible Securities, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 140–55 (2005).
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large effects on acquirer returns.13 Despite the importance of
contract design to outcomes, little attention has been given to
how contract drafters use historical outcomes to inform
subsequent contract drafting. This is in sharp contrast to the
focus on outcomes in other fields, such as medicine,
engineering, philanthropy, and education.14
The contracts literature has long been divided over how
contract terms evolve over time. Efficient contracting theory
takes the view that contract terms evolve via a market-based
natural selection process.15 According to this view, the goal of
contracting parties is to maximize the joint value created by

13 See Leonidas Barbopoulos & Sudi Sudarsanam, Determinants of
Earnout as Acquisition Payment Currency and Bidder’s Value Gains, 36 J.
BANKING & FIN. 678, 678 (2012); Reena Kohli & Bikram Jit Singh Mann,
Analyzing the Likelihood and Impact of Earnout Offers on Acquiring
Company Wealth Gains in India, 16 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 203, 203 (2013).
14 See generally PAUL BREST & HAL HARVEY, MONEY WELL SPENT: A
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR SMART PHILANTHROPY 135–66 (2008) (highlighting the
importance of measuring the return on philanthropic investments and
using this information when making subsequent investment decisions);
SIGURD SKOGESTAD & IAN POSTLETHWAITE, MULTIVARIABLE FEEDBACK
CONTROL: ANALYSIS AND DESIGN (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the use of feedback
mechanisms in systems engineering); Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman &
Jonah E. Rockoff, Measuring the Impacts of Teachers II: Teacher ValueAdded and Student Outcomes in Adulthood, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2633 (2014)
(demonstrating that students who are taught by high value-added teachers
have better outcomes in adulthood including higher rates of college
attendance and higher salaries); Scott L. Pomeroy et al., Prediction of
Central Nervous System Embryonal Tumour Outcome Based on Gene
Expression, 415 NATURE 436 (2002) (showing that the clinical outcomes of
children with embryonal tumors of the central nervous system known as
medulloblastomas are highly predictable based on gene expression profiles).
15 See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of
Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (2006); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
261, 278 (1985) (describing a “quasi-Darwinian evolutionary process” for
contract terms); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation in Corporate Contracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 760–61 (1997);
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 767, 787 (1995).
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the contract.16 Over time, sub-optimal terms that do not
maximize joint value are weeded out by value-maximizing
contract drafters. This process leads to an optimal steadystate contract design in which the terms of the contract
efficiently maximize the joint value for the parties.17 Yet there
is substantial scholarship that raises theoretical and
empirical challenges to this natural selection view, citing
examples of steady-state contracts that contain sub-optimal
terms and/or are inefficiently incomplete.18
16 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 544, 552 (arguing that
contracting parties aim to maximize joint value and that contract law
should facilitate this value-maximization); Robert E. Scott & George G.
Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 187, 188 (2005).
17 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991); Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns,
Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347 (1996). This view
of contract design efficiency is a contractual application of the classic Coase
Theorem that argues that with perfect information and no transaction costs,
resources will be allocated efficiently regardless of initial allocation. See
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–16 (1960). The
term “steady state” refers to the state of a system that has reached
equilibrium following an external shock. For a discussion of how contract
terms respond to external shocks, see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati,
Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of
Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 933–36 (2004) (discussing how
interpretive shocks can lead to changes in steady state contract terms and
providing empirical evidence from sovereign bonds); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu
Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 7–10, 27, 35–36 (2013) (proposing and testing a three-stage model of
contract evolution that includes pre-shock standardization, post-shock
innovation, and post-shock standardization).
18 Frequently cited challenges to the efficient contracting theory
include network and learning externalities, agency costs, cognitive biases
and bounded rationality. See Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Bounded
Rationality and Incomplete Contracts, 58 RES. IN ECON. 3, 5 (2004)
(describing how bounded rationality forces parties to write incomplete
contracts); Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese”, 77 CHI.KENT L. REV. 59, 60 (2001) (noting that iterations of contract forms do not
always improve forms and sometimes make the form worse); Kahan &
Klausner, supra note 17, at 350–64; Avery W. Katz, Contractual
Incompleteness: A Transactional Perspective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 169,
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As the above disagreement in the contracts literature
highlights, contract drafters are impeded in their ability to
iterate on contract design based on outcomes. This is partly
due to two technical barriers long faced by contract drafters.
First, contract drafters have traditionally had limited data on
contract terms and outcomes. 19 Most companies take an ad
172–73 (2005); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003)
(arguing that due to bounded rationality, term-takers in the context of
contracts of adhesion only consider a limited set of contract terms and
therefore term-givers have an incentive to choose inefficient, allocatively
favorable forms of the terms that are not considered); Russell Korobkin,
Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of
Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1586–87 (1998)
(discussing an inertia theory of contract negotiation in which parties prefer
previously used terms because of status quo and endowment bias); Russell
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608 (1998); Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 77, 78 (2014); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization:
The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 553–54 (1981) Kenneth
A. Adams, Copyright and the Contract Drafter, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 23, 2006, at
1–5 (discussing the difficulty of copyrighting novel contract terms). For an
excellent example of empirical evidence that runs counter to the natural
selection view of contract evolution, see MITU GULATI & ROBERT SCOTT, THE
3 1/2 MINUTE TRANSACTION 2–3 (2012) (describing the continued widespread
use of a “pari passu” clause in cross-border sovereign bond contracts
following an adverse judicial ruling that upset the standing interpretation
of the clause). As Gulati and Scott note, the pari passu clause continued to
be used in ninety percent of sovereign bond contracts despite the adverse
judicial interpretation. Id. In fact, use of the clause increased even as
understanding of its meaning decreased. Id. at 141.
19 See ANUJ SAXENA, ENTERPRISE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTING AN ECM SOLUTION 11–12, 16–17
(2008) (noting that most organizations manage contracts in an ad hoc
manner, which results in numerous problems including fragmented
contract data, poor visibility into contracts, ineffective contract monitoring,
and inadequate analysis of contract performance); GULATI & SCOTT, supra
note 18, at 4, 150 (identifying that the traditional structural division
between litigation and transactional law practice prevents transactional
lawyers from systematically modifying contract drafting based on litigation
outcomes); Hill, supra note 18, at 75–76 (describing the tension between a
contract as a document that meets the needs of the parties and a contract
as a method of capturing data for future use); Matthew Roach, Toward a
New Language of Legal Drafting, 17 J. HIGH TECH. L. 43, 46–48 (2016);
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hoc approach to managing their contracts.20 In many cases,
little or no contract data are collected in a systematic manner.
When contract data are collected, these data rarely include
contract outcomes such as whether a contract resulted in
litigation.21 As a result, even if companies have data on the
terms contained in their contracts, they cannot identify the
effects of those terms on key outcomes without outcome data.
Second, contract drafters have typically not had the analytical
tools necessary to conduct robust analysis of contract data. 22
Many companies engage in low levels of systematic data
analysis, or even forego the process entirely.23 Even if
companies do engage in analysis of contract data, it is

Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 822–23 (2006).
20 See SAXENA, supra note 19, at 11–12.
21 See Hill, supra note 18, at 69 (discussing how contract drafters lack
the incentive to follow-up with a contract once it has been drafted and
signed); George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity,
Technology, and Innovation in Contract Design, 18 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN.
177, 183–84 (2013) (noting that contract drafters pay little attention to the
consequences of contract drafting).
22 See LAWRENCE S. MAISEL & GARY COKINS, PREDICTIVE BUSINESS
ANALYTICS: FORWARD LOOKING CAPABILITIES TO IMPROVE BUSINESS
PERFORMANCE 62 (2014) (citing studies regarding how companies frequently
fail to engage in adequate analysis); GRETTA RUSANOW, KNOWLEDGE
MANAGEMENT AND THE SMARTER LAWYER 346 (2003) (describing how contract
drafters easily get overwhelmed when trying to process contract data); Peter
J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century:
Adding Value to the Client’s Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 17, 44–45 (2003) (discussing the difficulty of
processing large amounts of contract information in a meaningful way in a
short amount of time); Hill, supra note 18, at 76 (discussing how “noise” in
contract outcomes makes it difficult to determine the effects of terms on
outcomes); Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future
of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 928–29 (2013) (noting
that even if lawyers had all the data they could ask for, it would be
impossible for them to process these data using traditional mental heuristic
models).
23 See MAISEL & COKINS, supra note 22, at 62.
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typically summarization of historical terms rather than
prediction of future outcomes.24
Recent technological developments in contract data
collection and analysis are lowering the above barriers. 25
Building on these developments, this Article proposes
“predictive contracting,” a new method of contracting in which
contract drafters can design contracts using a technology
system that helps predict the connections between contract
terms and outcomes. For example, a predictive contracting
system with data on the terms and outcomes of thousands of
prior procurement contracts could inform a contract drafter
that version A of a delivery term is ten percent more likely to
result in late performance by a particular type of counterparty
than version B. Predictive contracting will be powered by
machine learning26 and draw on contract data obtained from
integrated contract management systems,27 natural language
processing,28 and computable contracts.29 Initially, predictive
contracting will be applied to relatively simple, high volume
contracts, such as sales and nondisclosure agreements. As
predictive contracting systems improve over time, they can
begin to be applied to more complex contracts, such as
financing and acquisition agreements. Unlike previous

Id. at 5.
In the words of Oliver Williamson, “[b]ut for the limited ability of
human agents to receive, store, retrieve and process data, interesting
economic problems vanish.” Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233,
234 n.5 (1979).
26 Machine learning is a category of artificial intelligence research that
focuses on building mathematical computer models that learn from data to
improve over time. See infra Section II.A.
27 Contract management refers to a broad category of workflow
processes and technology systems that allow companies to track and
manage their contracts from beginning to end. See infra Section II.C.1.
28 Natural language processing is a category of machine learning
research focused on enabling computers to understand natural language
communication, such as documents written in English. See infra Section
II.C.2.
29 A contract is computable if it is both machine-readable and machineexecutable. See infra Section II.C.3.
24
25
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contract automation mechanisms, such as LegalZoom, that
have primarily focused on making contracts cheaper and
faster to draft,30 predictive contracting aims to substantively
improve contract design by statistically connecting terms to
outcomes.
This Article makes both theoretical and practical
contributions to the contracts literature. On a theoretical
level, predictive contracting can lead to greater customization,
increased innovation, more complete contract design, more
effective balancing of front-end and back-end costs, better risk
assessment and allocation, and more accurate term pricing for
negotiation. On a practical level, predictive contracting has
the potential to significantly alter the role of transactional
lawyers by providing them with access to previously
unavailable information on the statistical connections
between contract terms and outcomes. In addition to these
theoretical and practical contributions, the Article also
anticipates and addresses limitations and risks of predictive
contracting, including technical constraints, concerns
regarding data privacy and confidentiality, the regulation of
the unauthorized practice of law, and the potential for
exacerbating information inequality.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II
introduces predictive contracting, discusses and provides
examples of the underlying technologies, and distinguishes
predictive contracting from prior versions of contract
automation. Part III discusses the theoretical and practical
implications of predictive contracting and addresses
limitations and risks. The Article ends with a short conclusion
that discusses opportunities for further research.

30 See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 6 (citing an interview with a
transactional lawyer in which the lawyer describes how contract
automation technology allows an associate to draft a sovereign bond
contract in only three and a half minutes); Triantis, supra note 21, at 179
(discussing how contract automation has focused on commoditizing
transactional legal work with the goal of cutting costs rather than
improving contract quality).
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II. PREDICTIVE CONTRACTING
This Part introduces predictive contracting, discusses and
provides examples of the underlying technologies, and
distinguishes predictive contracting from previous versions of
contract automation. Predictive contracting is a new method
of contracting in which contract drafters can design contracts
using a technology system that helps predict the connections
between contract terms and outcomes given a set of exogenous
conditions. Figure 1 depicts predictive contracting.
Figure 1: Predictive Contracting 31

31 The total number of variables for terms, conditions and outcomes
(represented by the subscripts x, y, and z) do not need to be equal. For
example, a predictive contracting scenario could contain three terms, ten
exogenous conditions, and two outcomes.
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As can be seen in Figure 1, contract terms result in
contract outcomes given a set of exogenous conditions.32 The
goal of predictive contracting is to help contract drafters
predict how terms are connected to outcomes given specified
conditions. Contract drafters can then use this information to
iteratively improve contract design over time.
A hypothetical example of predictive contracting can be
illustrative. In this example, assume a company enters into
simple sales contracts with its customers. One of the terms in
the template sales contract is a choice of law provision
between State A and State B. Looking to gain insights into the
effects of this choice of law provision, the company compiles a
data set of numerous past sales contracts. This data set
contains data on (1) whether a contract used State A or State
B for the choice of law provision, (2) whether the contract
resulted in arbitration and if so the costs associated with the
arbitration, and (3) a variety of exogenous conditions
including demographic data on the counterparty. The
company then uses this data to build a predictive contracting
model to see if the choice of law provision has an impact on
the likelihood and costliness of arbitration. The model
identifies that for a specific category of counterparty, State A
reduces overall arbitration costs, but for all other
counterparties, State B reduces arbitration costs. The
company uses this insight to set State B as the default for the
choice of law provision except when dealing with this
particular type of counterparty, thereby reducing overall
arbitration costs.
As the example shows, a predictive contracting system is
comprised of two primary technical components: (1) an
analytical model and (2) a data set of contract terms, outcomes
and exogenous conditions. These components are addressed in
the Sections below. As these Sections will demonstrate, the
individual technical components of predictive contracting
32 In most cases, outcomes will result probabilistically from terms and
exogenous conditions, though in some instances the association may be
determinative. For a discussion of how contract outcomes result
probabilistically from external contingencies and conditional instructions
contained within a contract, see GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 143.
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already exist and are currently being used in a variety of other
real-world contexts. The existence of these technologies
supports the technical feasibility of predictive contracting.
The Sections below provide examples of these technologies
and discuss how they will facilitate predictive contracting.
Predictive contracting systems will likely come in two
forms: (1) systems built by third-party technology companies
that are sold as software solutions to customers, and (2)
systems built in-house by large companies. Third-party
predictive contracting systems will primarily be marketed to
small and midsized companies. While most of these companies
will not have an incentive to develop predictive contracting on
their own due to relatively low contracting volume, thirdparty technology providers can overcome this incentive
problem by selling predictive contracting systems to multiple
small and midsized customers. In addition, technology
providers will be able to supply the complex technical
expertise needed to develop a predictive contracting system
that small-to-midsized companies may lack. This pattern is
already observable in the contract management industry. 33
Large companies, on the other hand, will likely have sufficient
contracting volume to be incentivized to develop predictive
contracting in-house and the resources to do so. In both cases,
predictive contracting systems will be designed such that
contract drafters can use them without a background in
statistics or computer science.
Predictive contracting will initially be applied to relatively
simple, high-volume contracts, such as sales and
nondisclosure agreements. In addition, predictive contracting
systems will begin by examining relatively narrow problem
specifications with a limited number of terms, outcomes, and
exogenous conditions. This is because the ability of a model to
predict outcomes of a system decreases as the complexity of
the system increases.34 Furthermore, the predictive capability
of a model generally increases as the amount of data the model
has access to increases. Therefore, examining narrow

33
34

See infra Section II.C.1.
See Katz, supra note 22, at 959–63.
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problems related to simple contracts with large amounts of
data is an ideal starting point for early versions of predictive
contracting. As predictive contracting models improve and
contract data becomes more robust, contract drafters can
begin to use predictive contracting to analyze broader
problems and more complex contracts such as financing and
acquisition agreements.
The remainder of this Part proceeds as follows. Section II.A
discusses the predictive contracting model, Section II.B
examines the necessary types of contract data, Section II.C
discusses potential sources of these data, and Section II.D
distinguishes predictive contracting from prior versions of
contract automation.

A. Model
The predictive contracting model is the analytical
mechanism that uses contract data to provide contract
drafters with insights into the statistical connections between
contract terms and outcomes given exogenous conditions. To
build a predictive contracting model, developers are likely to
rely heavily on a rapidly growing area of analytical
innovation: machine learning. Machine learning is a category
of artificial intelligence research that focuses on building
mathematical computer models that learn from data to
improve over time.35 Unlike earlier versions of artificial
intelligence that attempted to replicate the way the human
mind learns, machine learning instead seeks to achieve
analytical results by using data-driven statistical models
powered by computer processors.36 Machine learning models
35 See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87,
89 (2014).
36 See id. at 95–100; see also Katz, supra note 22, at 913–18 (discussing
how the increase in data-driven predictive analysis is made possible in part
due to the continually increasing power of computer processors described by
Moore’s Law and the continually decreasing cost of data storage described
by Kryder’s Law). For a discussion of Moore’s Law, see Gordon E. Moore,
Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 38 ELECTRONICS 114
(1965). For a discussion of Kryder’s Law, see Chip Walter, Kryder’s Law,
SCI. AM., Aug. 2005, at 32.
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have two main advantages over alternative analytical
methods such as causal inference. First, machine learning
models improve over time as more data are added to the data
set from which the model learns, which is known as the
“training set.”37 Second, machine learning models do not
necessarily require a pre-specified relationship between
independent and dependent variables. 38 This “black box”
approach allows machine learning models to provide valuable
predictive insights without the user needing to specify (or
even understand) the potential relationships between
variables in the model.39
Thus far, machine learning in the legal industry has
primarily been applied to litigation issues such as discovery,40
legal search,41 the setting of bail,42 and even jury selection.43
Perhaps the most interesting application of machine learning
to the law (and the most relevant for predictive contracting)
has been the prediction of case outcomes and judicial
decisions.44 Previously an academic endeavor, multiple
See Surden, supra note 35, at 92–93.
See Katz, supra note 22, at 949–53.
39 Id. While machine learning models do not necessarily require the
user to prespecify a relationship between the variables in the model, the
user must still select the data upon which the model is trained. For a
discussion of the risks associated with the “black box” nature of machine
learning models, see infra Section III.C.1.
40 See Katz, supra note 22, at 945; John O. McGinnis & Russell G.
Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the
Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041,
3047–48 (2014); Mark McKamey, Legal Technology: Artificial Intelligence
and the Future of Law Practice, 22 APPEAL 45, 49 (2017).
41 See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 40, at 3048–50.
42 See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and
Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1428 (2017).
43 See Social-Enriched Voir Dire, VIJILENT, https://www.vijilent.com/
jury-selection [https://perma.cc/QDP5-WRNJ]; VOLTAIRE, https://voltaire
app.com [https://perma.cc/NG3R-A5PM]. Voltaire is a technology system for
jury selection that is powered by machine learning. See id.
44 See Katz, supra note 22, at 936–39; Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M.
Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger & Pauline T. Kim, Competing Approaches to
Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 761, 761
(2004); McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 40, at 3052–53; Theodore W. Ruger,
37
38
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companies45 are now using machine learning to engage in case
prediction.46 Notable among these companies is Judicata.47
Judicata has built a machine learning prediction model
trained on publicly available case law and opinions. 48 Users
upload court documents for analysis such as motions and
briefs as well as contextual information, such as the cause of
action, the identity of the judge, and the location of the court.49
Judicata analyzes the document and generates a report that
assess the document in three categories: drafting, arguments,
and context.50 With respect to drafting, Judicata analyzes the
document’s citations and quotes for errors and potentially

Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court
Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1151–59 (2004);
Surden, supra note 35, at 108–10; Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots
Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law 30 (Nov. 27, 2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2701092 [https://perma.cc/W5TY-EC28]; Daniel Martin Katz,
Michael J. Bommarito II & Josh Blackman, A General Approach for
Predicting the Behavior of the Supreme Court of the United States, PLOS
ONE (Apr. 12, 2017), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371
/journal.pone.0174698 [https://perma.cc/JMQ4-EG48].
45 Much of this section is based on interviews conducted by the author,
which are cited throughout. These individuals spoke on conditions of
anonymity and therefore, out of respect for their privacy, names are omitted
from the citations. Notes from each interview are on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review.
46 See, e.g., LEXMACHINA, https://lexmachina.com [https://perma
.cc/F37M-B6G2]; PREMONITION, https://premonition.ai [https://perma.
cc/WFS3-8837]; RAVEL, http://ravellaw.com [https://perma.cc/4AHT-VHVB].
47 See JUDICATA, https://www.judicata.com [https://perma.cc/2PZP3T6A]; see also Itai Gurari, From Judging Lawyers to Predicting Outcomes,
OFFICIAL JUDICATA BLOG (Feb. 6, 2018), https://blog.judicata.com/fromjudging-lawyers-to-predicting-outcomes-f46aedeb8684 (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review); Beth Hoover, Judge Insights:
Understanding the Forest and the Trees, OFFICIAL JUDICATA BLOG (June 28,
2017), https://blog.judicata.com/judge-insights-understanding-the-forestand-the-trees-c3164b767a4c (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review).
48 Telephone Interview with Judicata Representatives (Apr. 2, 2018).
49 Id.
50 Id.
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recommends better sources.51 With respect to arguments, the
system breaks the document down into its constituent
arguments and displays the statistical favorability of those
arguments based on past cases. 52 The system can also
recommend missing arguments that it believes should be in
the document.53 Lastly, with respect to context, Judicata will
provide the user with information on the outcomes of past
cases with similar contextual characteristics. 54 In the future,
the company plans to enable the system to generate first
drafts of litigation documents. 55
Machine learning is also beginning to be applied in the
contracting context. Numerous contract technology companies
are leveraging machine learning to provide contract drafters
with insightful analysis. Contract Standards56 and Legal
Robot57 are using machine learning to enhance compliance
efforts by creating a map of a contract’s constituent parts that
can be connected with a map of an area of regulation to
determine if there are any regulatory conflicts.58 Legal
technology companies are also using machine learning for
predictive analysis. For example, Kira Systems 59 is working
on a machine learning model for risk prediction in corporate
acquisitions.60 Contract drafters would be able to use this
model to identify the likelihood of litigation risk associated
Id.
Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 CONTRACT
STANDARDS,
https://www.contractstandards.com/
[https://perma.cc/8LAG-CEH5].
57 LEGAL ROBOT, https://www.legalrobot.com/ [https://perma.cc/VP2FHYMG].
58 Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative (Mar.
6, 2018); Telephone Interview with Legal Robot Representative (Mar. 14,
2018). Contract Standards has mapped HIPAA and Legal Robot has
mapped regulatory changes pertaining to Brexit, the United Kingdom’s exit
from the European Union.
59 KIRA, https://kirasystems.com/ [https://perma.cc/P4UD-S4G3].
60 Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative (Mar. 12,
2018).
51
52
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with specific terms in acquisition agreements based on data of
past agreements and litigation. 61
A predictive contracting system using a machine learning
model would function as follows. First, a predictive
contracting technology provider (or a group within a large
company building a predictive contracting system) would
compile a data set of contract terms, outcomes, and exogenous
conditions.62 This data set would serve as the training set for
the machine learning model. The predictive contracting
company would then train a model based on this data set that
would identify connections between terms and outcomes of
interest given a set of exogenous conditions. Contract drafters
would then use this information to inform contract design
when drafting subsequent contracts. Data on the terms,
outcomes, and conditions associated with these subsequent
contracts would be collected and periodically added to the
training set to retrain the model. 63 As the data set expands
over time, the model would become more powerful and
therefore able to take on more complex prediction problems.
Building a machine learning model for a predictive
contracting system will require real-world contract data and
is beyond the scope of this Article. While there are numerous
standard machine learning models available for prediction
analysis,64 the design of a predictive contracting model will

Id.
For a discussion of these different types of data, see infra Section
II.B. For a discussion of potential sources of these data, see infra Section
II.C.
63 This is similar to how insurance companies use actuarial data to
update the terms and conditions of insurance contracts. See Boardman,
supra note 15, at 1114–16 (“Not only does past language become clearer over
time in the insurer’s eyes, but the cost of each clause becomes increasingly
clear as actuarial data is collected and pooled.”).
64 For example, IBM offers off-the-shelf machine learning software
through its Watson initiative. See Watson Machine Learning, IBM,
https://www.ibm.com/cloud/machine-learning
[https://perma.cc/6J2S59E4]. Common machine learning models include support vector machines
and random forest decision trees. Support vector machines are commonly
used in classification problems to sort data into defined categories. See
generally COLIN CAMPBELL & YIMING YING, LEARNING WITH SUPPORT VECTOR
61
62
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depend in large part on the characteristics of the contracting
problem being analyzed. Two key dimensions of any predictive
contracting model will be: (1) whether the model is single-task
or multi-task, and (2) whether the model is supervised or
unsupervised. These dimensions are discussed in the Sections
below.

1. Single-Task vs. Multi-Task
Single-task machine learning models are ideal for
scenarios in which the objective of the model is to solve a
single learning task.65 In the context of predictive contracting,
single-task learning will be effective when the outcomes being
predicted are largely independent from one another.66 For
example, assume that a contract drafter wants to understand
how a variety of contract terms and exogenous conditions
affect two outcomes: the amount of drafting time spent
obtaining internal approvals and the quality of service
provided by the counterparty under the contract. These
outcomes are unlikely to be related, so the contract drafter
could use two separate single-task learning models to predict
each outcome. The type of single-task model that is most
effective will depend on factors such as the amount of data in
the training set and whether the outcome variable is binary,
categorical, or numerical.67
Multi-task machine learning models, on the other hand,
are better suited for scenarios in which multiple learning
MACHINES (2011); NELLO CRISTIANINI & JOHN SHAWE-TAYLOR, AN
INTRODUCTION TO SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINES AND OTHER KERNEL-BASED
LEARNING METHODS (2000); INGO STEINWART & ANDREAS CHRISTMANN,
SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINES (2008). Random forests use a series of decision
trees to analyze classification and regression problems. See generally Tin
Kam Ho, Random Decision Forests, 1 PROC. 3RD INT’L CONF. ON DOCUMENT
ANALYSIS & RECOGNITION 278, 278–82 (1995); Leo Breiman, Random
Forests, 45 MACHINE LEARNING 5 (2001); Tao Shi & Steve Horvath,
Unsupervised Learning with Random Forest Predictors, 15 J.
COMPUTATIONAL & GRAPHICAL STATS. 118, 118 (2006).
65 Interview with Private Technology Company Representative, in S.F.,
Cal. (May 2, 2018).
66 Id.
67 Id.
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tasks need to be solved at the same time. 68 Multi-task
learning draws on similarities and differences between the
different learning tasks to improve efficiency and accuracy.69
In the context of predictive contracting, multi-task learning
will be useful when the outcomes being predicted are related
to one another.70 In the previous example, assume instead
that the contract drafter wants to predict both the likelihood
that the counterparty renews the contract and the likelihood
that the contract results in litigation. These outcomes are
likely to be related (a counterparty is less likely to renew a
contract that resulted in litigation), so the contract drafter
could use a multi-task learning model to predict both
outcomes. Multi-task learning will frequently utilize an
artificial neural network (often called a “neural net”), a
machine learning mechanism commonly used in image
recognition.71

2. Supervised vs. Unsupervised
Supervised machine learning models learn from a training
set of labeled data.72 For example, a supervised model

68 See
generally Andreas Argyriou, Theodoros Evgeniou &
Massimiliano Pontil, Convex Multi-Task Feature Learning, 73 MACHINE
LEARNING 243 (2008); Rich Caruana, Multitask Learning, 28 MACHINE
LEARNING 41 (1997); Carlo Ciliberto, Youssef Mroueh, Tomaso Poggio &
Lorenzo Rosasco, Convex Learning of Multiple Tasks and Their Structure 1
(Apr. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.03101
[https://perma.cc/NW2K-JJJ3].
69 See supra note 68.
70 Interview with Private Technology Company Representative, supra
note 65.
71 Id. See generally SIMON HAYKIN, NEURAL NETWORKS AND LEARNING
MACHINES (3d ed. 2009); Jürgen Schmidhuber, Deep Learning in Neural
Networks: An Overview, 61 NEURAL NETWORKS 85 (2015).
72 See MEHRYAR MOHRI, AFSHIN ROSTAMIZADEH & AMEET TALWALKAR,
FOUNDATIONS OF MACHINE LEARNING (2012); STUART RUSSELL & PETER
NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2010);
Surden, supra note 35, at 93; Irene Ng (Huang Ying), The Art of Contract
Drafting in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: A Comparative Study Based on
US, UK and Austrian Law 25 (Transatlantic Tech. L.F. Working Paper No.
26, 2017); Remus & Levy, supra note 44, at 9–10.
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designed to identify whether an image contains an apple
would be trained on a data set of images that a human had
gone through ahead of time and tagged which ones contained
apples. Based on this labeled data, the model would learn to
identify the image characteristics of an apple. In the
predictive contracting context, a supervised model would be
trained on labeled data of contract terms and outcomes. For
example, a supervised predictive contracting model designed
to identify connections between anti-dilution provisions in
venture financing agreements and entrepreneur ownership at
liquidation would be trained on a data set of contracts labeled
with their type of anti-dilution provision and the percent of
entrepreneur ownership at liquidation. The necessity of data
labeling for supervised learning emphasizes the importance of
collecting contract data that are properly formatted and
structured for use in machine learning. Part II.C below
discusses potential means of collecting contract data in this
manner.
Unsupervised machine learning models, on the other hand,
learn from unlabeled data. 73 In the apple image recognition
example above, an unsupervised model would be provided
with a data set of unlabeled images, some containing apples,
some not. In the predictive contracting context, an example of
unlabeled data would be a contract in Microsoft Word or PDF
format with none of its terms labeled ahead of time by a
human. Because unsupervised models do not require labeled
data, they are well-suited for situations in which labeling data
is difficult or impossible. Yet unsupervised models can prove
less effective than supervised models in situations in which
the user is interested in identifying connections between
specific inputs and outputs because these inputs and outputs
are not pre-defined by the user. For predictive contracting, if
a contract drafter is interested in understanding the
connections between a specific term or set of terms and a
73 See
UNSUPERVISED LEARNING: FOUNDATIONS OF NEURAL
COMPUTATION (Geoffrey Hinton & Terrence J. Sejnowski eds., 1999);
RICHARD O. DUDA, PETER HART & DAVID G. STORK, PATTERN CLASSIFICATION
517–600 (2d ed. 2001); Ng, supra note 72, at 25–26; Remus & Levy, supra
note 44, at 10–11.
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defined set of outcomes, a supervised model would likely prove
more effective. As a result, early versions of predictive
contracting will likely rely more heavily on supervised
learning due to initial applications of predictive contracting
being relatively specific and narrow in scope. As predictive
contracting expands in scope to address more complex
relationships between terms and outcomes, developers may
turn to unsupervised learning.

B. Data
A predictive contracting system running on machine
learning technology as discussed in Part II.A will require the
following three categories of contract data: (1) terms, (2)
outcomes, and (3) exogenous conditions. These data categories
are discussed in the Sections below.

1. Terms
The first category of data needed for predictive contracting
is data on contract terms. In the relationship depicted in
Figure 1, terms are the endogenous inputs that, when
combined with exogenous conditions, result in contract
outcomes. Terms are endogenous to the relationship between
the contracting parties because the parties chose to include
the terms in the contract. This is true even of non-negotiated,
boilerplate terms because the parties ultimately chose to enter
into a contract containing these terms. As a result, contract
terms are considered endogenous for the purposes of
predictive contracting even in the case of consumer contracts
of adhesion in which consumers are faced with “take-it-orleave-it” contracting scenarios.74 While contract design also
74 See generally Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer
Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008); Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric
Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be Met,
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723 (2008); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Michael
I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583 (1990); Andrew A. Schwartz,
Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON
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includes implied terms that are not expressly included in the
contract but are inferred by courts in the event of litigation,
these terms are difficult to incorporate into predictive
contracting because data on them cannot be collected from
contract documents like express terms. 75
Contract terms can be analyzed as individual terms or as
sets of multiple terms. The modular nature of contracts lends
itself to breaking contracts down into their constituent
terms.76 For example, a contract could be broken down into
Terms A, B, C, D, and E. A contract drafter could then use a
predictive contracting system to analyze the effects of each of
these terms on outcomes of interest given a set of exogenous
conditions. Recent research, however, has highlighted the
importance of the interconnectedness of contract terms to
overall contract design.77 In the previous example, the
contract drafter could also use predictive contracting to
analyze the joint effects of subsets of Terms A–E on the
outcomes of interest.
Contract term data can broadly be classified as binary,
categorical, or numerical.78 Binary term data can be used to
represent the presence or absence of a term in a contract. For
example, a contract data set could contain binary data on
whether or not an acquisition agreement contained an
earnout provision. Binary term data is most useful for
REG. 313 (2011); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); Anne
Brafford, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion:
Fair Play or Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331 (1996). For
a discussion of the implications of predictive contracting for consumer
contracts, see infra Section III.C.4.
75 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 262. For a discussion of issues
raised by terms and conditions that are difficult to capture, see infra Section
III.C.1.
76 See
Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement
Dealmaking in Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403,
1417–27 (2016) (discussing the modularity of merger and acquisition
contracts).
77 See Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal Structure, NW. U. L.
REV. 279, 279–85 (2018).
78 This is also true of outcome and condition data.
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examining the effects of terms for which there is little or no
variation in the form of the term across contracts other than
whether the term is present or absent. Categorical term data
can be used to represent different versions of a term.79 For
example, a contract data set could contain categorical term
data on the type of anti-dilution provision contained in a
venture financing agreement. Categories of terms can be
ordered or unordered. Ordered categories represent a logical
progression between the categories, such as different versions
of a penalty term with increasing levels of severity.
Categorical term data is most useful for examining the effects
of terms for which there is meaningful variation in the form of
the term across contracts. Numerical term data can be used to
represent terms with magnitude. For example, a contract data
set could contain numerical data on the interest rate in a debt
contract or the price in a procurement contract.

2. Outcomes
The second category of data needed for predictive
contracting is data on contract outcomes. In the relationship
depicted in Figure 1, outcomes are the outputs that result
from endogenous contract terms and exogenous conditions.
Contract outcomes are a means of assessing and measuring a
contract. Predictive contracting aims to help contract drafters
understand and predict the effects of terms on outcomes given
conditions so that drafters can design subsequent contracts
that result in better outcomes. The improvement of contract
outcomes is therefore the ultimate goal of predictive
contracting. In most contracting scenarios, parties and their
drafters will have to balance certain expected outcomes
against others when designing a contract. This aspect of
contract design will become a key role for transactional
lawyers in the presence of predictive contracting.80

79 Note that for categorical term data, one of the versions of a term
could be the absence of the term.
80 See infra Section III.B.
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Contract outcomes can assess both the front-end and backend of a contract’s life.81 The front-end is when the parties and
their agents negotiate and design the contract. Examples of
front-end outcomes include how long the contract took to
negotiate and how much the contract cost to draft. The backend is when the parties perform the obligations under the
contract and/or potentially dispute the contract. Examples of
back-end outcomes include the timing and quality of
counterparty performance and whether the contract resulted
in litigation. Contract outcomes can also be objective or
subjective. Examples of objective outcomes include whether
the contract was amended and the amount of any payments
made under the contract. Examples of subjective outcomes
include whether the parties believed the contract adequately
met their needs and whether the contract resulted in any
reputational effects for the parties.
Predictive contracting users will likely use a wide variety
of outcomes to assess their contracts, including front-end,
back-end, objective, and subjective outcomes.82 While many
outcomes will be specific to the contracting scenario being
analyzed, some general outcomes of interest include:
•

The amount of time to negotiate and draft the
contract

81 See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract
Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 851 (2010);
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (2005); Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 814;
Scott & Triantis, supra note 16, at 190. For a proposed model that includes
a third “midstream” stage, see Triantis, supra note 21, at 183–84.
82 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1129, 1158 (2006) (discussing how contracting parties balance
several goals when designing a contract); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G.
King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2009) (applying
organization theory to contracts to argue that contracts are strategically
important mechanisms that enable an organization to advance its strategic
goals); Ron Dolin, Measuring Legal Quality 2 (June 18, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2988647
[https://perma.cc/WX5D-AHLD ] (citing an example of DuPont developing a
diverse set of assessment outcomes for analyzing its litigation portfolio).
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The cost to negotiate and draft the contract
The extent of deviation between the first draft and
the final draft
The timing of counterparty performance
The quality of counterparty performance
Whether and how the contract was amended
Whether and why the contract resulted in a dispute
If the contract resulted in a dispute, how the
dispute was resolved (negotiation, arbitration,
litigation, etc.)
If the contract resulted in a dispute, the cost of the
dispute
The
total
cost of
negotiating, drafting,
administering, and resolving the contract
Whether the parties were satisfied with the
contract
Whether the contract resulted in any reputational
effects for the parties

3. Conditions
The third category of data needed for predictive
contracting is data on exogenous conditions. In the
relationship depicted in Figure 1, conditions are the
exogenous inputs that, when combined with endogenous
terms, result in contract outcomes. Contracting does not exist
in a vacuum, but rather against a backdrop of external factors
that can influence contract design and outcomes. 83 For
example, whether the parties to an acquisition agreement are
public or private can have substantial effects on the design of
the agreement and numerous outcomes of interest. While
some insights could be gained from a predictive contracting
model trained only on terms and outcomes, the quality of the

83 See Williams, supra note 2, at 149–54 (demonstrating that the total
supply of venture capital financing had statistically significant connections
with a variety of contract terms based on a set of over 5000 venture capital
financing contracts from 2004–2015). The author controlled for a number of
other external factors such as industry, location, and the risk-free treasury
rate. See id. at 151–53.
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results generated by the model can be improved by including
data on relevant exogenous conditions.84
For the purposes of predictive contracting, a condition is
considered exogenous if one or more of the parties cannot
feasibly modify it as part of the contract design process. This
includes conditions over which the parties have no control,
such as general economic conditions and geopolitical factors.
This also includes conditions over which the parties do have
control but cannot feasibly modify as part of the contracting
scenario being analyzed. For example, while the location of a
party’s headquarters may be a relevant condition for a simple
procurement contract, and while the party does have control
over this condition, it cannot feasibly move its headquarters
for the purposes of designing the contract. As a result, the
location of the party’s headquarters would be considered an
exogenous condition when analyzing the procurement
contract using a predictive contracting system.
While many conditions will be specific to the contracting
scenario being analyzed, some general conditions include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Party characteristics (identity, location, size,
industry, etc.)
Drafter characteristics (identity, location, law firm,
etc.)
Whether the parties have a preexisting relationship
and the nature of that relationship
Whether the contract is based on a prior contract
between the parties
General industry conditions
General economic conditions
Geopolitical conditions

84 Determining which exogenous conditions are “relevant” will require
iterative trial and error. Contract drafters will initially include exogenous
conditions for which they have data and believe could potentially influence
design and/or outcomes. The models they develop will then provide insight
into whether those conditions are in fact relevant.
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C. Data Sources
Data on contract terms, outcomes, and conditions for use
in predictive contracting will primarily come from three
sources: (1) contract management systems, (2) natural
language processing, and (3) computable contracts. These
data sources are discussed in the Sections below.

1. Contract Management
Contract management refers to a broad category of
workflow processes and technology systems that allow
companies to track and manage their contracts from
beginning to end.85 While many companies still manage their
contracts through a combination of email and Excel
spreadsheets, a growing percentage of companies are turning
to dedicated contract management systems. 86 Contract
management systems include both systems developed inhouse for use by a single company, 87 as well as third-party
contract management providers that sell contract
management software to a wide range of customers.88 While
many companies still use contract management systems
primarily as repositories for contract documents, a growing

85 See SAXENA, supra note 19, at 12 (“Enterprise Contract Management
(ECM) encompasses a wide spectrum of applications, protocols, and systems
for managing an enterprise’s contracts from A to Z.”).
86 In a 2017 survey by SpringCM, thirty-two percent of respondents
reported that they manage their contracts with a contract management tool.
See MATT STERN, SPRINGCM, 2017 STATE OF CONTRACT MANAGEMENT REPORT
9 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
87 Interview with Oracle Representative, in S.F., Cal. (Apr. 10, 2018);
Telephone Interview with Airbnb Representatives (Apr. 26, 2018);
Telephone Interview with Microsoft Representatives (Apr. 12, 2018);
Telephone Interview with Public Technology Company Representative
(Apr. 30, 2018).
88 For a list of some of the primary contract management providers, see
Contract Management Software, CAPTERRA, https://www.capterra.com/
contract-management-software [https://perma.cc/9E2Z-G2FA].
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number of companies are starting to use these systems as data
sources for a variety of applications. 89
Contract management systems increase the availability of
data on contract terms. Companies use contract management
systems to track data on key terms as well as conditions such
as party identities, locations, and dates.90 Companies will
often begin the contracting process with an internal
template.91 Contract drafters will negotiate the templatebased contract with the counterparty based on a set of preapproved negotiating ranges for various terms. 92 Any
modifications that fall outside these pre-approved ranges
must typically go through an internal approval process. 93
Once the contract has been finalized, contract drafters can
track any deviations from the template terms in the contract

89 See Andrew Bartels & Charlotte Wang, The Forrester WaveTM:
Contract Life-Cycle Management, Q3 2016, FORRESTER, July 25, 2016, at 2–
3 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
90 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview
with Dell Representative (Apr. 11, 2018); Telephone Interview with
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Private
Technology Company Representative (Apr. 13, 2018); Telephone Interview
with Public Technology Company Representative, supra note 87.
91 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview
with Dell Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview with
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Private
Technology Company Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview
with Public Technology Company Representative, supra note 87.
92 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview
with Dell Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview with
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Private
Technology Company Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview
with Public Technology Company Representative, supra note 87.
93 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview
with Dell Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview with
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Public
Technology Company Representative, supra note 87.
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management system.94 In some cases, these systems can be
used to collect data on hundreds of contract terms. For
example, Dell works with Axiom, an alternative legal services
company that provides contract management solutions, to
collect over three hundred data points from each of its
contracts.95 This process of tracking contract terms is even
more streamlined if a company uses an end-to-end contract
management system that also supports drafting and
negotiation. These systems allow contract drafters to draft
and negotiate contracts entirely within the system, thereby
increasing the ability to collect data on contract terms. 96 For
example, Icertis is a leading contract management company
that provides customers with an integrated, end-to-end
system within which they can draft, negotiate, and track all
of their contracts.97
In addition to collecting data on contract terms, contract
management systems can also collect valuable data on
contract outcomes. This includes front-end outcomes such as
the time required to draft and negotiate the contract, overall
drafting costs, and term-by-term negotiating outcomes.98 For
example, Contract Room enables contract drafters to collect
front-end outcomes, such as, how long a contract takes to
94 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview
with Dell Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview with
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Public
Technology Company Representative, supra note 87.
95 Telephone Interview with Axiom Representative (Mar. 9, 2018);
Telephone Interview with Dell Representative, supra note 90.
96 See Interview with Contract Room Representative, in Palo Alto, Cal.
(Apr. 9, 2018); Telephone Interview with Icertis Representative (Mar. 15,
2018); Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 3, 2018);
Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27, 2018).
97 Telephone Interview with Icertis Representative, supra note 96; see
also
ICERTIS,
https://www.icertis.com/contract-management-software/
[https://perma.cc/P6Z8-T8BA].
98 Interview with Contract Room Representative, supra note 96;
Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview
with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Public
Technology Company Representative, supra note 87.
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negotiate, how frequently certain terms are negotiated, which
terms create the most negotiating roadblocks, and the total
cost to draft and negotiate the final contract. 99 Contract
management systems can also collect data on back-end
outcomes such as payments and deliveries made under the
contract, whether deal risks flagged during negotiation
actually occur, and whether the contract results in a dispute
(and if so, the outcome of the dispute).100 For example, Sirion
Labs enables contract drafters to collect data on numerous
back-end contract outcomes.101 For a particular contract, a
Sirion user can see if the contract is in dispute, and if so, the
current stage of the dispute.102 The system links disputes to
specific terms within the contract so the user can see which
terms cause disputes.103 Once a dispute is resolved, the
system displays the outcome of the dispute and any associated
costs.104 Contract managers can also use Sirion to track
counterparty performance under a contract.105 For a contract
with a server provider, for example, the system can track the
percentage of time, within a defined period, during which the
servers were online and running properly.106 The system also
Interview with Contract Room Representative, supra note 96.
Interview with Contract Room Representative, supra note 96;
Telephone Interview with Dell Representative, supra note 90; Telephone
Interview with Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone
Interview with Sirion Labs representatives, supra note 96; Telephone
Interview with Sirion Labs Representative, supra note 96.
101 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27,
2018), supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative
(Apr. 3, 2018), supra note 96.
102 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27,
2018), supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative
(Apr. 3, 2018), supra note 96.
103 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27,
2018), supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative
(Apr. 3, 2018), supra note 96.
104 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27,
2018), supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative
(Apr. 3, 2018), supra note 96.
105 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs representative (Apr. 27,
2018), supra note 96.
106 Id.
99

100
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uses customizable formulas to convert counterparty
performance data into payment obligations under a
contract.107 As the use of contract management systems such
as Sirion continue to grow, contract drafters will have
increasingly better access to data on contract terms and
outcomes.

2. Natural Language Processing
One of the primary hurdles to collecting data on contract
terms for machine learning is that these data are stored in an
unstructured format within natural language contract
documents such as English-language Microsoft Word files and
PDFs.108 Despite contract documents containing significant
amounts of data,109 these data are not in a form that is easily
useable for machine learning analysis due to their lack of
structure and labeling. 110 To systematically analyze contract
terms, companies have traditionally had to manually extract,
structure, and label data from natural language documents,
which is an incredibly time and labor-intensive process.111 For
example, some large law firms will have junior associates

107 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27,
2018), supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative
(Apr. 3, 2018), supra note 96.
108 See Roach, supra note 19, at 46; Harry Surden, Computable
Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 642–44 (2012) (distinguishing
“natural languages” such as English from “formal languages” such as
computer programming languages).
109 See Roach, supra note 19, at 50–51 (describing contracts as a
mineable source of data).
110 See Surden, supra note 108, at 642–44; Roach, supra note 19, at 46.
111 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview
with Contract Assistant Representative (Mar. 8, 2018); Telephone
Interview with Private Technology Company Representative, supra note 90;
Telephone Interview with Public Technology Company Representative
(Apr. 4, 2018); Telephone Interview with Public Technology Company
Representative, supra note 87.
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review contracts after signing for the purpose of entering
contract data into an internal database. 112
Natural language processing (NLP) is a category of
machine learning research focused on enabling computers to
understand natural language communication.113 Most NLP
techniques are statistical in nature. 114 Drawing on a training
set of existing natural language documents, NLP models can
be trained to understand natural language text based on
statistical relationships between components of the text such
as individual words, groups of words, word sequencing, and
physical layout features like paragraph breaks and page
positioning.115 An NLP model is often adjusted and retrained
until it is sufficiently accurate at understanding natural
language text.116 The model can then be used to process new
natural language documents outside of the training set. In the
legal context, NLP has primarily been applied to litigation
discovery to help human document reviewers sort through
massive amounts of discovery documents.117
Numerous legal technology companies have begun to use
NLP to extract structured contract term data from natural

112 See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of
Transactional Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 397 (2015). For example, an
associate might note in the database whether a venture financing contract
contains an anti-dilution provision, and if so, what type.
113 See Surden, supra note 108, at 643. For an overview of NLP, see
generally CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING & HINRICH SCHÜTZE, FOUNDATIONS OF
STATISTICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 3–5 (1999); RUSSELL &
NORVIG, supra note 72, at 860–67; Robert Dale, Classical Approaches to
Natural Language Processing, in HANDBOOK OF NATURAL LANGUAGE
PROCESSING 1–7 (Nitin Indurkhya & Frederick J. Damerau eds., 2d ed.
2010); Prakash M. Nadkarni, Lucila Ohno-Machado & Wendy W. Chapman,
Natural Language Processing: An Introduction, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORM.
ASS’N 544 (2011).
114 See Surden, supra note 108, at 644.
115 Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative (Mar. 5,
2018); Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note
60.
116 Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative (Mar. 8, 2018);
Telephone Interview with LegalSifter Representative (Mar. 14, 2018).
117 See Surden, supra note 108, at 644.
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language contracts.118 Using NLP to generate structured
contract term data is far more efficient, cost-effective and
scalable than the manual alternative. Many legal NLP
companies also create application programming interfaces
(“APIs”) that allow their products to integrate with contract
management systems.119 This enables a company to track and
use the contract data obtained via NLP within its contract
management system. While non-legal NLP companies often
use off-the-shelf NLP software,120 legal NLP companies must
typically create their own models due to the highly technical
and unnatural nature of legalese. 121 For example, LawGeex
developed their own NLP model specifically for understanding
contractual legalese called Legalese Language Processing
(“LLP”).122 LawGeex’s proprietary LLP model was trained for
over three years on over 400,000 contracts to understand the
unique phrasing, sentence structure, and terminology of
contractual legalese.123
The main differentiating factor among legal NLP products
is whether the NLP model is pretrained. Pretrained (also
known as “out-of-the-box”) models are typically trained on
large data sets (thousands, tens of thousands, or even
hundreds of thousands) of relatively simple contracts such as

118 See Our Services, CONTRACTSTANDARDS, https://www.contract
standards.com/Services
[https://perma.cc/48YC-3R3V];
EBREVIA,
https://ebrevia.com [https://perma.cc/6K6K-H8T8]; How Kira Works, KIRA
SYSTEMS,
https://www.kirasystems.com/how-it-works
[https://perma.cc/N9N9-CXUU];
LAWGEEX,
https://www.lawgeex.com
[https://perma.cc/ZM36-GG3U]; LEGAL ROBOT, https://www.legalrobot.com
[https://perma.cc/K3TL-WJTK]; LEGALSIFTER, https://www.legalsifter.com
[https://perma.cc/Q2W9-HM7Q].
119 Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note
115; Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative, supra
note 58; Telephone Interview with Beagle Representative (Mar. 9, 2018);
Telephone Interview with eBrevia Representative (Apr. 6, 2018).
120 Telephone Interview with Legal Robot Representative (Mar. 14,
2018).
121 Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative (Apr. 11, 2018).
122 Id.
123 Id.; see also Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative
(Mar. 8, 2018).
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sales and nondisclosure agreements. 124 For example, Contract
Standards trained its pretrained model on publicly available
contracts obtained through the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s EDGAR database. 125 The advantage of
pretrained models is that users can apply them immediately
without having to train the models themselves.126 The
downside, however, is that pretrained models cannot be used
to understand types of contracts and terms that are not
contained within the supplied training set. 127 As a result,
pretrained models are not applicable for more niche and
complex types of contracts. User-trained models, on the other
hand, can be applied to any type of contract, but the user must
supply the contracts that make up the training set. 128 The
number of contracts needed for a user to train a model with
sufficient accuracy depends on the complexity and variability
of the contract—the more complex and variable the terms in
the contract, the larger the required training set. 129 For
example, Kira Systems offers a user-trained model that can
be applied to any type of contract.130 To use the model, the
124 Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative,
supra note 58; Telephone Interview with eBrevia Representative, supra
note 119; Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra
note 115; Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra
note 60; Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note
123; Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note 121;
Telephone Interview with LegalSifter Representative, supra note 116.
125 Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative,
supra note 58; see Filings & Forms, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml [https://perma.cc/GK9T-6539].
126 Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note 123;
Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note 121.
127 Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note 123;
Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note 121.
128 Telephone Interview with Beagle Representative, supra note 119;
Telephone Interview with eBrevia Representative, supra note 119;
Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 115;
Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 60;
Telephone Interview with LegalSifter Representative, supra note 116.
129 Telephone Interview with eBrevia Representative, supra note 119.
130 Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note
115; Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 60.
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user must provide at least fifty contracts in which the terms
of interest have been pre-labeled by the user.131 The user then
clicks a button labeled “Train,” which trains the model on the
contracts provided.132 After the model has finished training,
the system displays the model’s accuracy.133 One legal NLP
company, LegalSifter, has developed a hybrid NLP product
that resembles both a pretrained and a user-trained model.134
LegalSifter will work with users to develop user-trained NLP
models specifically for a user’s niche contracts and terms. 135
LegalSifter then makes these models available to other users
with similar niche contracts. 136 The models are retrained
every week to take into account feedback and new data from
all users.137 Through this process, LegalSifter can effectively
crowdsource the training of new models for any type of
contract.138 Legal NLP products—including pretrained, usertrained, and hybrid models—will increase the availability and
quality of data on contract terms.

3. Computable Contracts
While less developed than contract management systems
and natural language processing, computable contracts
present a compelling opportunity for expanding the
availability and quality of contract data. A contract is
“computable” if it is both machine-readable and machineexecutable.139 A contract is machine-readable if it is expressed
131

Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative supra note

115.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note
115; Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 60.
134 Telephone Interview with LegalSifter Representative, supra note
116.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See Surden, supra note 108, at 634–36. Computable contracts are
often referred to as “smart” contracts. This Article uses the term
“computable” rather than “smart” because “computable” addresses the
132
133
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in a format that can be processed by a computer.140 As
discussed above, most contracts are written in a natural
language, such as English, that is not inherently interpretable
by a computer. While natural language processing techniques
are starting to enable computers to understand natural
languages,141 researchers in a related field of computer
science are developing computer programming languages that
can be used to express contracts in a fully machine-readable
format.142 For example, Sudhir Agarwal, Kevin Xu, and John
Moghtader recently developed a computable contracting
language they refer to as Contract Definition Language,
which they used to model HIPAA regulations.143 A
computable contract is also machine-executable, which means
the contract can be automatically executed when supplied

machine-interpretability that is at the heart of computable contracts
whereas “smart” can mean many different things in different contexts.
140 Id. at 639.
141 See supra Section II.C.2.
142 See generally Roach, supra note 19, at 54–59; Mark D. Flood &
Oliver R. Goodenough, Contract as Automaton: The Computational
Representation of Financial Agreements (Office of Fin. Research Working
Paper No. 15-04, 2017), https://www.financialresearch.gov/workingpapers/2015/03/26/contract-as-automation [https://perma.cc/4C9T-LPS2];
Tom Hvitved, Contract Formalisation and Modular Implementation of
Domain-Specific Languages (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Copenhagen), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/33db/bb29ed7e
5b7c58dc651a8 c3223bc9711a863.pdf (on file with the Columbia Business
Law Review); Ronald M. Lee, Candid: A Formal Language for Electronic
Contracting (Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2071383
[https://perma.cc/Z2BZ-TTA7];
Seyed Morteza Montazeri, Nivir Kanti Singha Roy & Gerardo Schneider,
From Contracts in Structured English to CL Specifications (Sept. 13, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.2657 [https://perma.
cc/LR9D-YUK7]; Nick Szabo, A Formal Language for Analyzing Contracts
(2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://nakamotoinstitute.org/contractlanguage [https://perma.cc/9ZC2-MVKY].
143 See Sudhir Agarwal, Kevin Xu & John Moghtader, Toward
Machine-Understandable Contracts, in A14J – Artificial Intelligence for
Justice, Workshop at the 22nd European Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.ecai2016.org/content/uploads/
2016/08/W2-ai4j-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYR2-PC6T].
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with real-world performance data.144 For example, a
computable weather derivative contract could automatically
transfer money between the parties based on real-world
weather data. While Sirion Labs does not automatically
execute contracts between parties, their feature that allows a
user to calculate contractual obligations based on real-world
performance data is a simplified version of a machineexecutable contract.145
Once fully developed, computable contracts will be the
ideal mechanism for collecting contract data.146 Data on
contract terms can be easily collected from a computable
contract because the contract is already written in a
structured, machine-readable format. This is a substantial
advantage over manually collecting term data from a natural
language contract or even automatically extracting the data
via natural language processing. Rather than needing to
collect term data from a contract ex post, the terms of a
computable contract are available for computational analysis
throughout the contract’s entire life. Computable contracts
will also improve the collection of contract outcome data.
Because computable contracts need real-world performance
data to self-execute, this back-end outcome data can also be
captured. For example, a computable contract for the delivery
of widgets could collect performance data such as when the
widgets are delivered, how many widgets are delivered, and
the quality of the widgets delivered. Based on this
information, the contract could determine whether the
delivering party properly performed and, if so, how much the
party should be paid under the contract. If the delivering
party does not properly perform, the contract could flag that

144 See Surden, supra note 108, at 658–59. Computable contracts can
be used to collect outcome data regardless of whether the contract is
completely self-executing or whether the contract merely produces a prima
facie assessment that is then reviewed by the parties. Id. at 636. As a result,
this Article does not take a position on whether computable contracts should
be completely self-executing.
145 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
146 See Surden, supra note 108, at 690–94 (noting that computable
contracts can be used as inputs for other systems).
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there is a dispute. Meanwhile, all of this outcome data could
be collected and made available for analysis.
Although computable contracts are not yet available for
widespread use, a critical technological innovation has
substantially increased their feasibility: blockchain. Initially
introduced in 2008, blockchain is best known as the
technology that underlies digital currencies such as bitcoin.147
A blockchain is a continuously growing public ledger of
transactions (known as “blocks”) supported by a distributed,
peer-to-peer network that uses cryptography to ensure the
validity of the blocks in the overall chain. 148 The key feature
of a blockchain network is that it does not require a trust
intermediary such as a bank or clearinghouse to validate
transactions on the network.149 Instead, the integrity of a
blockchain network is maintained by what is commonly
referred to as a “proof-of-work” system.150 A proof-of-work
system functions by having a distributed network of “miners”
147 For the original Bitcoin paper that introduced blockchain
technology, see Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/N55DLTXA]. The paper was published under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto.
The identity of the person or persons who created Bitcoin and blockchain
remains a mystery, though there are many theories. See Satoshi Nakamoto,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satoshi_Nakamoto [https://perma
.cc/2CKU-K6WK].
148 See Nakamoto, supra note 147; see also Catherine Martin
Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and
Enforcement in Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17 NEV. L.J. 139, 152
(2016); Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer
Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36–37 (2014); Shahla
Hazratjee, Note, Bitcoin: The Trade of Digital Signatures, 41 T. MARSHALL
L. REV. 55, 58–60 (2015); Trevor Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in
Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 578–80 (2015);
Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS.
REV., Feb. 2017; Emile Loza de Siles, Blockchain: A Short Primer for
Lawyers, L.J. NEWSLETTERS, Mar. 2017, http://www.lawjournalnews
letters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/03/01/blockchain-a-shortprimer-for-lawyers/?slreturn=20180408202029[https://perma.cc/P446KVT8 ].
149 See Nakamoto, supra note 147; see also Christopher, supra note 148,
at 17; Fairfield, supra note 148, at 40; Kiviat, supra note 148, at 574.
150 See Nakamoto, supra note 147, at 3.
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complete computationally difficult cryptographic tasks to
verify transactions on the blockchain network.151 Each
verified transaction block is added to a chain of previously
verified blocks and the “longest” chain (i.e. the sequence with
the most verified transactions) is treated as the official
chain.152 Miners are rewarded for their work with units of
value on the network, of which Bitcoin is an example. 153 To
disrupt the validity of a blockchain network, a bad actor would
need to amass a majority of computing power on the network,
which could be incredibly expensive.154 Such an actor would
not have an incentive to do so, however, because trust in the
network would deteriorate and the actor’s units of value on
the network would become worthless. 155 While public
attention has largely focused on blockchain’s cryptocurrency
applications, many commentators have noted that
blockchain’s ability to verify transactions without needing a
trust intermediary has the potential to enable computable
contracts.156
Companies and organizations have begun to experiment
with blockchain-enabled computable contracts, the most
notable of which is Ethereum.157 Ethereum has created a
blockchain-enabled platform on top of which users can build

Id.
Id.
153 Id. at 4.
154 Id. at 3. This is commonly referred to as a fifty-one percent attack.
155 Id. at 4.
156 See Christopher, supra note 148, at 16; Karen E.C. Levy, BookSmart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts and the Social
Workings of Law, 3 ENGAGING SCI., TECH., & SOC’Y 1, 1–3 (2017); Max
Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO L. TECH. REV. 305,
317–19 (2017); Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 128, 145–46 (2017); Hazratjee, supra note 148, at 83; Kiviat, supra
note 148, at 573, 603, 605–06.
157 See A Next Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized
Application Platform, GITHUB, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/W
hite-Paper
[https://perma.cc/9YT8-KRPP];
see
also
Ethereum,
https://www.ethereum.org [https://perma.cc/NM4H-DXRF].
151
152
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their own computable contract applications. 158 The platform
even includes a “contract-oriented” programming language for
computable contracts, known as Solidity.159 Using Solidity,
computable contract developers can implement any number of
innovative contract designs. As platforms such as Ethereum
continue to grow and improve, computable contracts will
likely begin to move into the mainstream of contracting,
thereby creating new opportunities for collecting high-quality,
structured contract data at scale. Future research will be
needed to explore how to best design computable contracts to
function as mechanisms for data collection.

D. Beyond Automation
Predictive contracting differs from traditional contract
automation both in its primary objective and in its
technological foundation. Introduced in the 1970s, 160 contract
automation technology has traditionally focused on reducing
the cost and time associated with drafting a contract.161 The
classic example of this type of contract automation is
LegalZoom, a web-based service that allows users to generate
legal documents covering issues ranging from employment
agreements to wills and trusts to basic intellectual property
matters.162 The target user is a non-lawyer who wants a fast
and cheap way to generate a legal document without having

158 See A Next Generation, supra note 157, at 14 (describing Ethereum
as “a blockchain with a built-in Turing-complete programming language,
allowing anyone to write smart contracts and decentralized applications
where they can create their own arbitrary rules for ownership, transaction
formats and state transition functions”).
159 See SOLIDITY, https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.4.23 [https://per
ma.cc/W3BJ-8JSZ].
160 See Kathryn D. Betts & Kyle R. Jaep, The Dawn of Fully Automated
Contract Drafting: Machine Learning Breathes New Life into a Decades-Old
Promise, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.216, 218 (2017).
161 See supra note 30.
162 See LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com [https://perma.cc/
4VNV-EH7N].
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to hire a lawyer.163 The documents involved tend to be highly
standardized and require relatively little customization.
There are also automation products targeted at lawyers that
help them assemble routine documents in a short amount of
time.164 In both cases, the automation technology is intended
to reduce the time and cost of producing a “good enough”
contract. Predictive contracting, on the other hand, is focused
on making contracts substantively better by providing
contract drafters with statistical insights into the connections
between contract terms and outcomes.
Predictive contracting also employs fundamentally
different technology than traditional contract automation
products. Most contract automation tools are built on top of
pre-coded, rules-based logic systems.165 These tools ask the
user a variety of questions, and then, based on the user’s
responses and the system’s internal logic (developed with the
input of a subject matter expert such as a lawyer), present the
user with additional questions until the tool has worked
through the entire logic tree.166 The tool then generates a
document for the user from a set of pre-coded terms.167 Unlike
traditional automation tools, the internal logic of a predictive
contracting system does not have to be explicitly defined ex
ante.168 Instead, predictive contracting relies on statistical
machine learning models that develop their own logic over
163 LegalZoom, however, does offer a premium service to connect users
with a lawyer for more complex matters.
164 Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, a large Silicon Valley law firm,
developed an internal automation tool that allows associates to generate a
full set of “startup documents” for a new company, including a certificate of
incorporation, founder stock purchase agreements, and company bylaws, by
answering a set of pre-generated questions. See WSGR Term Sheet
Generator, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, https://www.wsgr.com/
WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=practice/termsheet.htm [https://perma
.cc/P4RP-BLZF].
165 See Betts & Jaep, supra note 160, at 218–19.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See Surden, supra note 35, at 93–95; Remus & Levy, supra note 44,
at 9 (distinguishing between deductive instructions and data-driven
instructions).
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time based on a training data set. 169 Two primary
implications arise from this technological difference. First,
because a traditional automation tool derives its logic from a
real-world expert, such as a lawyer, it will never be able to
generate a better contract than the expert could have
generated on her own (though the tool will often be faster and
cheaper). Predictive contracting, on the other hand, generates
its insights by analyzing large amounts of data in a way that
a lawyer cannot. As a result, a predictive contracting system
is complimentary to a lawyer’s experience as opposed to
merely replicative. Second, traditional automation tools are
static whereas predictive contracting is dynamic. A
traditional tool has to be pre-coded and therefore its logic
cannot change over time unless it is recoded. On the other
hand, a predictive contracting system can continuously
update its logic as it is supplied with additional data from
subsequent contracts, thereby improving its accuracy and
generating better insights.

III. DISCUSSION
Predictive contracting has theoretical and practical
implications. At the same time, predictive contracting faces a
variety of limitations and risks. This Part examines these
issues and proceeds as follows. Section III.A discusses the
theoretical implications of predictive contracting, Section
III.B discusses the practical implications, and Section III.C
discusses the limitations and risks.

A. Theoretical Implications
Predictive contracting has multiple implications for the
theory of contract design. The Sections below examine how
predictive contracting can lead to (1) greater customization,
(2) increased innovation, (3) more complete contract design,
(4) more effective balancing of front-end and back-end costs,
(5) better risk assessment and allocation, and (6) more
accurate term pricing for negotiation.
169

See supra Section II.A; see also Surden, supra note 35, at 93–95.
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1. Customization
Contracts (both business-to-business and business-toconsumer) frequently display a high
degree of
standardization.170 This can be seen in the widespread use of
boilerplate provisions in commercial contracts.171 These
boilerplate terms often prove quite resistant to change and
will sometimes remain in use despite adverse shocks.172 This
prevalence of standardization runs counter to the traditional
efficient contracting view that predicts that parties to a
contract will select the set of terms that maximizes the joint
value generated by the contract.173 Assuming that contracting
scenarios display some degree of heterogeneity from one
scenario to the next, contracts should reflect this

170 See generally GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18; Boardman, supra note
15; Choi & Gulati, supra note 17; Choi & Gulati, supra note 82; Choi, Gulati
& Posner, supra note 17; Goetz & Scott, supra note 15; Hill, supra note 18;
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15;
Klausner, supra note 15; Korobkin, supra note 18; Richman, supra note 18;
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9; Triantis, supra note 21.
171 See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 2–3 (describing the use of a
“pari passu” clause in over ninety percent of cross-border sovereign bond
contracts); Choi & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1130 (discussing the use of form
contracts in business-to-consumer contracting); Hill, supra note 18, at 59,
63 (highlighting the use of forms in transactional law practice and
describing how law firms use forms during the drafting process); Kahan &
Klausner, supra note 15, at 718 (describing evidence of contractual
boilerplate, such as bond indentures and corporate charters); Klausner,
supra note 15, at 762 (discussing the use of form documentation in corporate
contracting).
172 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 17, at 934–35 (providing empirical
evidence of a slow shift in standardized terms following an external shock);
Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 17, at 3, 7–10 (proposing a model of
boilerplate evolution in which an external shock disrupts pre-shock
standardization causing a period of innovation that ultimately leads to postshock standardization). The authors provide empirical evidence for this
model of evolution from New York and English sovereign bond markets. Id.
at 27, 35; see also GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 2–3 (discussing how a
boilerplate “pari passu” clause used in cross-border sovereign bond
contracts failed to be modified or discontinued even after an adverse judicial
interpretation).
173 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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heterogeneity in their design. Yet this is typically not
observed.
The contracts literature has posited numerous
explanations for the prevalence of standardized terms in
commercial contracts.174 From these varied explanations, two
common themes arise. First, standardized terms are faster
and cheaper to use than nonstandard terms and therefore
standardization reduces transaction costs.175 Second,

174 For
a good overview of proposed reasons for contract
standardization, see GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 34–43 (discussing
reasons including learning externalities, network externalities, negative
signaling, hindsight bias, satisficing, drafting routinization, herd behavior,
collective action and free riding, endowment effects, and a lack of
understanding of boilerplate terms). For a discussion of learning and
network externalities, see Choi & Gulati, supra note 17, at 934–36
(providing empirical evidence of network externalities in the sovereign bond
market); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 718–27, 742–60 (describing
the effects of learning and network externalities and providing empirical
evidence from bond covenants). For a discussion of cognitive biases, see
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17, at 359–64 (discussing status quo bias,
anchoring bias, and conformity bias); Korobkin, supra note 18, at 1586–87
(describing how status quo and endowment bias lead to a higher prevalence
of standardized terms). For a discussion of herd behavior, see GULATI &
SCOTT, supra note 18, at 149; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17, at 356–58
(noting that contract drafters are incentivized to use standardized, widelyused terms because if these terms fail, then the drafters are failing as a
group rather than individually). For a discussion of agency costs, see GULATI
& SCOTT, supra note 18, at 6 (arguing that inefficient standardization in the
sovereign bond market arose because contract drafters were incentivized to
promote volume-based, “cookie-cutter” transactions); Hill, supra note 18, at
77–78 (discussing how law firms frequently lack an incentive to produce a
better form); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17, at 353–55; Richman, supra
note 18, at 79–82 (identifying that contract drafters are incentivized to use
standardized terms that have previously been used and that law firms are
incentivized to develop routines for the mass production of homogenous
contracts).
175 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 262–64, 290 (describing how
implied contract terms reduce transaction costs by providing contracting
parties with standardized “preformulations”); Klausner, supra note 15, at
782–84 (discussing how it is cheaper and faster for contract drafters to use
standardized terms); Triantis, supra note 21, at 186–87 (noting that
standardized terms reduce costs associated with contract drafting primarily
because they can easily be redeployed).
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standardized terms are more familiar to the contracting
parties, lawyers, third parties, and courts and are therefore
more predictable than nonstandard terms. 176
Despite these apparent benefits, contracts can be
inefficiently over-standardized. For example, assume that a
company can choose between multiple different available
versions of a particular contract term (Versions A, B, C, etc.).
Over time, the company has settled on Version A as the
standard version of the term. Version A is cheap and reliable.
Assume that the cost to include Version A in the contract is
effectively zero and the joint value generated by Version A in
any contracting scenario is $10. In certain contracting
scenarios, however, other versions of the term, while costlier
to include, generate a net joint value of greater than $10. For
example, in certain scenarios, Version B, which costs $10 to
include, generates a joint value of $30 for a net joint value of
$20, greater than the joint value generated by Version A. As
a result, the standardized practice of always using Version A
leads to a loss of total joint value across all contracting
scenarios.
Predictive contracting can lead to a more efficient mix of
standardization and customization in three ways. First,
predictive contracting can reduce the cost and time associated
with drafting and incorporating nonstandard terms. A
predictive contracting system can supply contract drafters
with a library of available contract terms. Instead of having to
craft bespoke contract terms from scratch (a costly and time176 See Boardman, supra note 15, at 1107 (proposing that contract
drafters may be willing to accept a standardized term that has an inefficient
judicial interpretation as long as that interpretation is fixed and therefore
produces little to no uncertainty); Choi & Gulati, supra note 17, at 931
(highlighting that standardized terms reduce uncertainty); Goetz & Scott,
supra note 15, at 263–64 (noting that courts have a preference for
standardized implied terms and often disapprove of attempts to modify
these terms with nonstandard express terms); Kahan & Klausner, supra
note 17, at 353–55 (describing how contract drafters—who are often
lawyers—are typically more risk averse than parties and therefore are more
likely to use standardized terms than would otherwise be efficient due to
the low uncertainty of these terms); Klausner, supra note 15, at 776–79
(discussing the judicial interpretative benefits of using standardized terms).
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consuming process), contract drafters can select from different
versions of terms available in the predictive contracting
system and customize them as necessary. For example, Sirion
Labs provides contract drafters with a contract creation tool
that uses historical contract data. 177 The tool contains a
searchable, filterable library of all of the user’s past contract
terms.178 For a given term, the tool displays different versions
of that term that the user has used before.179 A contract
drafter can build a draft of a contract by dragging and
dropping terms from the term library into the draft, modifying
them as necessary and supplying condition data such as party
identities and dates.180 Second, predictive contracting can
make nonstandard terms more predictable, thereby reducing
the uncertainty associated with these terms. A predictive
contracting system can supply contract drafters with
information on the statistical connections between contract
terms and outcomes, including the likelihood of litigation and
potential adverse judicial interpretation. Equipped with this
information, contract drafters can make better-informed
decisions about the inclusion of nonstandard terms. 181 Third,
predictive contracting can facilitate the use of highly-tailored,
context-specific contract terms. A predictive contracting
model can take into account exogenous conditions, such as
party and transaction characteristics, and provide the
contract drafter with insights into how these external factors
177

Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative, supra note

96.
178 Id. For example, a user can filter the term library based on
characteristics such as the type of contract, the name of the counterparty,
the counterparty’s industry, and the jurisdiction of the contract. Id.
179 Id. Contract drafters can label these terms for negotiation purposes
as either “preferred,” “fall-back,” or “walk-away.” Id.
180 Id.
181 This requires the predictive contracting system to have been trained
on contracts containing nonstandard terms. For some nonstandard terms,
it may be the case that they have been used so infrequently that there are
insufficient data to train the model. From a prediction perspective,
nonstandard terms such as these are similar to novel terms that have never
been used. For a discussion of how predictive contracting can assist with the
generation of novel terms, see infra Section III.A.2.
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affect the connections between terms and outcomes. Contract
drafters can use this information to select the best set of terms
given the exogenous conditions present in the contracting
scenario.
Returning to the hypothetical example discussed above, a
predictive contracting system could enable the company to
identify the contracting scenarios in which alternative
versions of the term in question generate greater joint value
than Version A. As a result, the company would be able to
select the value-maximizing version of the term in each
contracting scenario. In addition, an easily-accessible library
of terms containing examples of alternative versions would
likely reduce the cost associated with using these alternative
versions. As this example demonstrates, predictive
contracting can lead to a more efficient selection of contract
terms given a set of exogenous conditions.

2. Innovation
Closely related to the issue of standardization versus
customization is the issue of contract innovation. Whereas
customization is concerned with the selection of efficient
contract terms from a set of available terms and the tailoring
of those terms to specific contracting scenarios, innovation is
concerned with the generation of new terms. 182 Contract
innovation is critically important to contract design because it
is the source of novel terms. 183 Contract innovation expands
the option set of available terms from which contract drafters
can select when designing a contract. Yet despite the
importance of contract innovation, contract drafters rarely
innovate.184
182 See Triantis, supra note 21, at 192 (discussing the difference
between customization and innovation and highlighting the scalability of
innovative terms).
183 See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 164 (stressing the importance
of contract innovation).
184 See generally GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18; Boardman, supra note
15; Choi & Gulati, supra note 17; Goetz & Scott, supra note 15; Kahan &
Klausner, supra note 17; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15; Triantis, supra
note 21.
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The contracts literature suggests two primary reasons for
the inefficiently low level of contract innovation observed in
the market.185 First, innovative terms have not been
previously assessed by the contracting parties, lawyers, third
parties, and courts, and are therefore more uncertain than
existing terms.186 Second, parties typically have a difficult
time identifying the effects of specific terms, and therefore,
contract drafters (who are primarily evaluated on whether a
contract performs poorly) have little incentive to take on the
cost and risk of innovating if success from their innovation is
unlikely to be recognized.187 For example, assume a contract
drafter is faced with a decision between using an existing term
or a new term. The existing term is familiar and has a 100%
chance of generating $10 of value for the drafter’s client. The
new term, on the other hand, has a 50% chance of generating
$50 and a 50% chance of losing $10, for an expected value of
$20.188 Assuming the client is risk neutral,189 it would prefer
185 A third, related reason for the lack of innovation flows from the two
primary reasons: organizational impediments faced by contract drafters.
See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 145–49, 161 (describing barriers to
innovation within law firms, including examples of contract drafters being
reprimanded for attempting to innovate); Smith & King, supra note 82, at
31 (noting how contracts can become intertwined with other organizational
processes, which leads to innovation inertia); Triantis, supra note 21, at 186
(discussing structural impediments that prevent contract drafters from
having an incentive to innovate).
186 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 263 (discussing how innovative
terms are more likely to be misinterpreted by courts).
187 See Gardner, supra note 22, at 43–44 (providing examples of the
difficulty parties face in determining the value of services provided by
contract drafters); Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 291 (noting that contract
drafters considering innovating must incur the cost of identifying terms that
are superior to existing terms); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17, at 353–
55 (discussing how contract drafters are frequently judged based on
whether a contract fails rather than whether they identify the optimal set
of terms and that the success of a new term may not be attributed to the
contract drafter’s innovation); Triantis, supra note 21, at 180, 194 (arguing
that contract innovation is stymied by the inability of parties to evaluate
the effects of specific contract terms).
188 Expected value = (0.5 * $50) + (0.5 * -$10) = $20.
189 An entity is risk neutral if it prefers the option with the greatest
expected value, regardless of risk.
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that the contract drafter use the new term. Assume, however,
that the client cannot observe the magnitude of the result,
only whether the result is positive or negative.190 In this
example, the contract drafter will always choose the existing
term, which has a 100% chance of generating a positive result,
even though the new term is better for the client. This
principal-agent problem can lead contract drafters to select
terms that serve their own interests, but not necessarily those
of their clients.
Predictive contracting can lead to a greater level of
contract innovation in three ways. First, predictive
contracting can track the effects of innovative terms by
identifying ex-post connections between these terms and
various contract outcomes. If contract drafters have an
effective means of demonstrating to parties the effects of their
innovations, they will have a much stronger incentive to
innovate in the first place. In the above example, the contract
drafter could use a predictive contracting system to show the
client that the new term generates a greater expected value
than the existing term over a sufficiently large number of
contracting instances. In this example, the predictive
contracting system aligns the incentives of the client and the
contract drafter, thereby helping to mitigate the principalagent problem.
Second, unlike traditional automation technologies,
predictive contracting can assist with the generation of new
terms.191 Natural language processing (“NLP”) can break
contract terms down into their constituent conceptual
subparts, known as ontologies.192 For example, Legal Robot is

190 This is a simplified representation of the fact that parties typically
evaluate a contract drafter based on whether the contract did “poorly” or
not.
191 See Betts & Jaep, supra note 160, at 227 (noting that historically,
contract automation tools have been unable to produce novel contract
language).
192 Telephone Interview with Legal Robot Representative, supra note
120; see Dominique Estival, Chris Nowak & Andrew Zschorn, Towards
Ontology-Based Natural Language Processing, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
WORKSHOP ON NLP AND XML 59–66 (2004).
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developing NLP technology that deconstructs contract terms
into the fundamental building blocks of contract language. 193
A predictive contracting system equipped with this technology
could identify connections between these contract subparts
and various contract outcomes. Contract drafters could use
this information during the contract innovation process to
have an understanding ex ante of the potential effects of a new
term. Figure 2 shows an example of this process.
Figure 2: Innovation Example

As can be seen in Figure 2, a predictive contracting system
equipped with ontological NLP technology can deconstruct
two terms, Term 1 and Term 2, into their constituent
subparts. Term 1 is comprised of Subparts A, B, and C and
Term 2 is comprised of Subparts A, D, and E. A contract
drafter is considering using a new term, Term 3, that is
comprised of Subparts A, B, D, and E. Based on prior use of
Terms 1 and 2, the predictive contracting system can provide
the contract drafter with information on connections between
the subparts that make up Term 3 and various contract

193

120.

Telephone Interview with Legal Robot Representative, supra note
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outcomes. This information can help the contract drafter
understand the likely effects of Term 3 on relevant outcomes.
For example, the drafter may be particularly concerned with
the likelihood of Term 3 resulting in litigation and can
therefore examine the connections between Subparts A, B, D,
and E and litigation outcomes. The predictive contracting
system enables the contract drafter to predict potential effects
of an innovative term.
Third, predictive contracting can enable contractual
experimentation. If a company engages in a sufficiently large
volume of contracting, it can use predictive contracting to “A/B
test” a new contract term or set of terms. For example, assume
a company currently uses Version A of a term but is interested
in potentially using Version B. Using predictive contracting
technology, the company could run a controlled experiment in
which it randomly assigns Version A to one set of contracts
and Version B to another set. The company can then track the
effects of Versions A and B on outcomes of interest.

3. Completeness
Contracts are frequently described as a set of conditional
directions that specify the obligations of the parties with
respect to one another in a variety of contingent future
states.194 Based on this view, the ideal contract is a “complete
contingent” contract, one that contains directions for every
possible future state of the world. 195 Despite the appeal of
contractual completeness, real-world contracts are incomplete
because they do not account for all potential contingencies.196
194 See Anderlini & Felli, supra note 18, at 4 (modeling contracts as
algorithmic maps that connect contingent states with the actions to be taken
if those states occur); Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 264 (noting that the
key feature of a contract is the ability to specify directions for future
contingencies); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 557 (highlighting the
“intertemporal” nature of contracts); Scott & Triantis, supra note 16, at 188
(defining a contract as a legally binding promise to act in the future).
195 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 267; Williamson, supra note 25,
at 236.
196 See generally Anderlini & Felli, supra note 18; Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
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While the contracts literature provides multiple explanations
for contractual incompleteness,197 by far the most common
explanation is that there are too many potential contingencies
for contract drafters to feasibly design contracts that account
for all future states.198 As a result, contracts are often
incomplete, especially with respect to low-likelihood
contingencies.199

Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Choi & Gulati, supra note 82; Claire
A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of
Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191 (2009); Choi & Triantis, supra
note 81; Katz, supra note 18; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9; Scott &
Triantis, supra note 19; Scott & Triantis, supra note 16.
197 For a good literature summary of contractual incompleteness, see
Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 816; see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note
196, at 94 (describing how a party may strategically withhold information
that would make a contract more complete so as to increase its percentage
share of the value generated by the contract); Choi & Triantis, supra note
81, at 859–60 (arguing that contractual incompleteness “can facilitate the
provision of efficient incentives and the signaling of private information at
the time of contracting and of renegotiation”); Hill, supra note 196, at 208–
12 (discussing how contractual incompleteness increases the uncertainty
and potential cost of litigation and can therefore serve as an ex ante bonding
mechanism to deter ex post litigation); Katz, supra note 18, at 172–74.
198 See Anderlini & Felli, supra note 18, at 8 (defining incomplete
contracts as “contracts that show evidence that the contracting parties were
constrained in their ability to distinguish between states when the contract
was drawn up”) (emphasis in original); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 196, at
92–94; Choi & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1159 (describing how parties
rationally choose to neither contract for every contingency nor clarify every
potential meaning of a term and therefore accept contractual
incompleteness); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 594–95; Scott &
Triantis, supra note 16, at 189–90 (arguing that complete contingent
contracts are impossible given the costs associated with planning for all
potential future states); Smith & King, supra note 82, at 7, 17.
199 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 559 (noting that parties will
often choose not to bear the costs associated with contracting for low
likelihood contingencies); Choi & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1155–56 (citing
Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 747
(1999) (discussing how incompleteness in industry customs is often
associated with low probability contingencies that trade associations choose
not to expend resources on)).
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Predictive
contracting
can
increase
contractual
completeness by providing contract drafters with information
on the set of potential future states and their associated
likelihoods. For example, assume a contract drafter is
designing a term for a contract and is deciding what potential
contingencies to plan for. From the drafter’s personal
experience and that of her colleagues, the drafter knows that
Contingencies A and B are by far the most common and that
Contingency C occasionally happens as well. Traditionally,
the drafter would likely design the term to account for
Contingencies A, B, and C. Assume instead, however, that the
drafter has access to a predictive contracting system trained
on a dataset of thousands of similar contracts. The system
shows the drafter that Contingency A occurs fifty percent of
the time, Contingency B occurs forty percent of the time,
Contingency C occurs five percent of the time, and
Contingencies D through H each occur approximately one
percent of the time. The drafter can then use this information
to design a more complete term. While complete contingent
contracts are still infeasible, 200 predictive contracting can
increase contractual completeness relative to traditional
contracting.

4. Cost Balancing
The costs associated with a contract can be divided
between the front-end and the back-end of the contract’s
life.201 Front-end costs include any costs to negotiate the
contract, conduct due diligence, design and draft the contract,
and execute the contract. 202 Back-end costs include any costs
200 But see Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving
Contracts, 43 J. CORP. L. 1, 1, 12–15 (2017) (suggesting that advances in
predictive analytics will eventually lead to contracts that are perfectly
complete because they will use technology and data to convert ex ante
objectives into ex post directives for the parties given any set of
contingencies).
201 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
202 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 81, at 851; Posner, supra note 81,
at 1583–84; Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 814, 817, 822–24; Scott &
Triantis, supra note 16, at 190–91.
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to perform obligations under the contract, monitor
performance, and potentially renegotiate, arbitrate, or litigate
the contract.203 Between the front-end and back-end of a
contract’s life, uncertainty is resolved regarding which
contingent state of the world will occur.204 According to the
contracts literature, parties should (and do) balance front-end
and back-end costs.205 The general view is that investing in
front-end costs reduces back-end costs.206 For example,
spending additional resources during the front-end to make a
contract more complete and precise reduces the likelihood
that the contract will result in litigation, and if it does, reduces
the likelihood that a judge will misinterpret the contract.207
In order for contract drafters to efficiently balance frontend and back-end costs, they need to understand the
connections between these costs. Without this information,
203 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 81, at 851; Posner, supra note 81,
at 1583–84; Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 814, 817, 822–24; Scott &
Triantis, supra note 16, at 190–91.
204 See Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 823 (drawing the distinction
between the front-end and back-end of a contract’s life as the resolution of
uncertainty).
205 See Posner, supra note 81, at 1583–84; Scott & Triantis, supra note
19, at 814, 817, 836 (proposing the use of indifference curves to model the
efficient tradeoff between front-end and back-end costs); Scott & Triantis,
supra note 16, at 196–98.
206 See Posner, supra note 81, at 1608; Scott & Triantis, supra note 19,
at 814, 817, 822–24, 836; Scott & Triantis, supra note 16, at 196–98. But see
Hill, supra note 196, at 208–12 (arguing that less specific contract terms,
which lead to lower front-end costs, can serve as a bonding mechanism that
deters parties from engaging in litigation, thereby reducing back-end costs
as well); Choi & Triantis, supra note 81, at 852–55, 859–60, 883, 885, 921–
22 (arguing that vague terms with lower front-end costs can incentivize an
efficient provision of information ex ante to deter adverse selection, thereby
reducing back-end litigation costs). Choi & Triantis provide a series of
numerical examples for their proposed theory using the context of a
material adverse change clause in an acquisition agreement. See Choi &
Triantis, supra note 81, at 896–920.
207 The tradeoff between vague (less costly) and precise (costlier)
contract terms during the front-end and the effects of contractual
preciseness on back-end litigation costs has been compared to the tradeoff
between rules and standards from the literature on legislation and
regulation. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 820.
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parties may engage in inefficient balancing. For example,
assume that a contract drafter is considering how much time
and effort to invest in the design of a term during the frontend of a contract’s life. The drafter can either design a vague
term that is less expensive (Term 1) or a precise term that is
more expensive (Term 2). Assume Term 2 is $10 more
expensive in the front-end than Term 1. The drafter should
therefore select Term 2 if Term 2 will save more than $10 in
expected value on the back-end relative to Term 1. Assume
the relevant back-end cost in this scenario is potential
litigation and that litigation carries a cost of $100. The drafter
should therefore use Term 2 if Term 2 reduces the likelihood
of litigation relative to Term 1 by more than 10%. 208 To make
this determination, the drafter needs information on the
front-end cost of Term 2 relative to Term 1, the cost of
litigation, and the reduction in the likelihood of litigation
associated with Term 2 relative to Term 1. If the drafter
mistakenly believes that Term 2 reduces the likelihood of
litigation by 15% but Term 2 actually only reduces the
likelihood by 5%, the drafter would inefficiently invest in
Term 2 during the front-end, thereby increasing overall
contracting costs.
Predictive contracting can lead to more efficient cost
balancing by providing contract drafters with key information
regarding front-end and back-end costs. A predictive
contracting system can track both front-end and back-end
costs associated with a particular type of contract. The system
can then use these data (along with data on relevant
exogenous conditions) to identify connections between front208 The drafter should use Term 2 if the benefit of Term 2 relative to
Term 1 is greater than the cost of Term 2 relative to Term 1, which is $10.
The benefit of Term 2 relative to Term 1 can be represented as the reduction
in the likelihood of litigation multiplied by the cost of litigation, which is
$100. The balancing equation is therefore: Cost of Term 2 = $10 < Benefit of
Term 2 = Reduction in Litigation Likelihood * $100. The benefit of Term 2
is therefore greater than the cost of Term 2 if Term 2 reduces the likelihood
of litigation by more than ten percent. This is a contractual application of
the famous formula for determining negligence set forth by Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947).
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end and back-end costs. In the previous example, a predictive
contracting system could provide the contract drafter with the
expected front-end costs of Terms 1 and 2 and the range of
expected litigation outcomes (including likelihoods and costs)
associated with these terms. The contract drafter would
therefore be able to make a better-informed (and likely more
efficient) cost balancing decision. In addition, as discussed
previously, predictive contracting systems can reduce the cost
of designing and drafting customized, context specific
terms.209 This enables contract drafters to include precise
terms in the front-end at lower cost, thereby increasing the
number of situations in which front-end investment can
reduce overall contracting costs.

5. Risk Assessment and Allocation
Most traditional contracting occurs under uncertainty.210
At the time of designing a contract, the parties and their
contract drafters typically do not know which contingent state
of the world will occur, nor do they know the full set of possible
contingent states or the probability distribution of these
states. Contract drafters, like most humans, are bad at
making decisions under uncertainty, especially when dealing
with very low-probability contingencies.211 Drafters are much
See supra Section II.A.1.
See Boardman, supra note 15, at 1107; Choi & Gulati, supra note
17, at 931; Choi & Triantis, supra note 81, at 882; Hill, supra note 196, at
208–12; Korobkin, supra note 18, at 1622; Scott & Triantis, supra note 19,
at 823; Scott & Triantis, supra note 16 (describing the difficulty contract
drafters face in attempting to achieve both ex ante and ex post efficiency
under uncertainty); Smith & King, supra note 82, at 7; Williamson, supra
note 18, at 555 (listing uncertainty as one of the three key features of
contracts along with frequency and asset specificity); Williamson, supra
note 25, at 259 (discussing the importance of transaction-specific contract
design under uncertainty).
211 See Hill, supra note 18, at 73; Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 38 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000)
(discussing the difficulty humans face in estimating low-probability
outcomes); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1, 4–5 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000). Much of the literature on law
209
210
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better equipped, however, to make decisions under risk.212
The distinction between risk and uncertainty is that unlike
uncertainty, risk involves a known set of possible outcomes
and the probability distribution of those outcomes. 213 A coin
flip is the classic example of risk: the coin flipper knows that
the two possible outcomes are heads or tails and that the
likelihood of each is fifty percent. Most people would much
rather make a decision using a coin flip as opposed to a
method with unknown outcomes and probabilities. While realworld situations are generally far more complex and often
involve a mix of uncertainty and risk, the core observation is
that humans are better equipped to make decisions when they
have information on possible outcomes and their likelihoods.
Accurately assessing risk is especially important in the
context of contracting because risk allocation is a key feature
of many contracts.214
and behavioral economics builds on the work of Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297
(1992); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251
(1986).
212 See Hill, supra note 18, at 74–75.
213 See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, 198–99 (1921)
(proposing the original distinction between risk and uncertainty); see also
Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative
Ignorance, 110 Q.J. ECON. 585, 585 (1995); Hill, supra note 18, at 74–75.
214 See Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk
Through Reverse Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1163–68 (2010)
(discussing the role of reverse termination fees in the allocation of risk in
corporate acquisitions); Choi & Triantis, supra note 81, at 851 (arguing that
risk allocation is a significant component of contract design that enables
efficient decisions regarding investment, contracting, and trade); Robert T.
Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses
in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2007–
09 (2009) (presenting the results of an empirical study of risk allocation via
material adverse change (“MAC”) clauses in corporate acquisitions, finding
that MAC clauses typically allocate four types of risk: systematic risks,
indicator risks, agreement risks, and business risks).
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Companies are currently using contract data to facilitate
more effective contract risk assessment and allocation. For
example, Microsoft tracks contract risks identified during the
contract design stage to determine how frequently these risks
occur. The company then uses this information to inform the
design of future contracts.215 When Microsoft negotiates a
contract, the contract team puts together a risk profile of the
expected risks associated with the contract.216 The company
uses this risk profile when determining whether to enter into
the contract and whether to negotiate specific nonstandard
terms.217 After the contract is signed, Microsoft tracks which
of the identified risks (if any) occur during the performance of
the contract as well as any unidentified risks. 218 The company
then uses these data to update its standard terms and
improve its risk assessment process.219 For example, if
Microsoft always negotiates against the inclusion of a
particular type of penalty provision, but then the data show
that the penalty in question never occurs, the company can
consider altering its assessment of the riskiness of such a
provision.220 Microsoft’s system for tracking contract risk data
allows it to make better-informed risk assessment and
allocation decisions.
Predictive contracting can enable parties to convert
contract uncertainty into contract risk. By tracking contract
outcomes, a predictive contracting system can provide
contract drafters with information on the set of potential
contingent states and their respective likelihoods, thereby
quantifying uncertainty. Equipped with distributional
information on contract outcomes, contract drafters can more
effectively assess contract risk. In addition, a predictive
contracting system can identify connections between contract
design and contract risks. This allows contract drafters to
better evaluate the risk profile of a contract given its terms
215
216
217
218
219
220

Telephone Interview with Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and relevant exogenous conditions. Predictive contracting also
creates opportunities for new term designs that use
distributional data on contract outcomes. Contract drafters
can use outcome probability distributions to craft terms that
have contingent effects based on the relation of a given
outcome to the expected probability distribution of that
outcome. These terms could enable contract drafters to more
effectively allocate contract risk.

6. Negotiation and Term Pricing
According to the efficient contracting literature, the goal of
contracting parties is to maximize the joint value created by
the contract.221 Parties select the set of contract terms that
maximize the joint value and then divide up the value via the
price term based on their relative bargaining power.222 Under
this view, parties optimize for the size of the pie, not how the
pie is sliced. This view relies on the unrealistic assumption,
however, that parties contract under perfect conditions,
including full information and no transaction costs. 223 In the
presence of contracting imperfections, such as asymmetric
information, parties are often unable to achieve the valuemaximizing contract design.224 Instead of focusing on joint
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
This view has been described as an “irrelevance” theory of
bargaining power because according to this theory, the relative bargaining
power of the parties does not affect the design of the contract, but rather
only affects the price. See Williams, supra note 2, at 106–07; Choi &
Triantis, supra note 2, at 1670.
223 See Williams, supra note 2, at 110.
224 See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 32–
33 (1995); LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 222, at 38–40, 245–46; ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 9 (2000); Ian Ayres
& Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 736–37, 742 (1992); Choi &
Triantis, supra note 2, at 1687–89; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property
Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1132 (1990); Jason
Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 615–16, 636–37 (1990); Korobkin, supra
note 18, at 1206 (arguing that costly information leads parties to choose
221
222
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value maximization, parties typically use their bargaining
power to jockey for contract terms that are allocatively
advantageous but not necessarily value-maximizing.225 In
their efforts to secure a larger piece of the pie, parties often
end up with a smaller pie.
Predictive contracting can improve contract design in the
presence of contracting imperfections by providing parties
with better information on the value of specific contract terms.
This information enables parties to more accurately price
contract terms during the negotiation process.226 For
example, assume two parties are negotiating which version of
a term to include in a contract. Party A prefers Version 1 and
Party B prefers Version 2. Under traditional contracting, in
the presence of incomplete information, the parties would
likely use their relative bargaining power to determine which
version of the term to include. Assume, however, that the
parties have access to a predictive contracting system that can
inefficient, allocatively advantageous terms as opposed to efficient terms);
Williams, supra note 2, at 113–15.
225 See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract
Design: Variations in Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 53–55 (2013)
(discussing how lending covenants were primarily borrower-friendly from
2000–2007 and then shifted to be lender-friendly after the financial crisis);
Choi & Triantis, supra note 2, at 1693 (discussing how material adverse
change definitions in merger agreements shift between seller-friendly and
buyer-friendly forms); de Fontenay, supra note 112, at 395–98, 405–13;
Williams, supra note 2, at 151–58 (finding a statistically significant
connection between bargaining power and a variety of venture capital
financing terms in venture capital contracts from 2004–2015); Joseph W.
Bartlett, Sea Change, VC EXPERTS, https://www.vcexperts.com/
reference/buzz/63 [https://perma.cc/Q539-7V2P] (discussing how venture
financing terms became much more investor-friendly following the dot com
crash of 2000–2001).
226 Large law firms currently use privately compiled contract data to
help their clients gain a bargaining advantage via more accurate term
pricing. See de Fontenay, supra note 112, at 396–98. Law firms only use
these data to engage in relative term pricing, however, as opposed to
absolute pricing. Id. at 425–26 (“[T]ransactional lawyers are likely to be
more accurate at ranking terms against one another (‘Term A should be
worth more to you than Term B’) than at ascribing a specific value to each
term (‘Term A should be worth x dollars to you’).”). Predictive contracting
can enable term pricing that is far closer to absolute pricing.
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identify the expected values of the terms for each party. For
example, assume Version 1 has an expected value of $20 for
Party A and $10 for Party B and Version 2 has an expected
value of $10 for Party A and $30 for Party B. Using this
information, the parties can see that the joint expected value
of Version 2 ($40) is $10 greater than the joint expected value
of Version 1 ($30). Even if Party A has greater relative
bargaining power, Party A is still likely to agree to use Version
2 in exchange for a more favorable price term.227 Predictive
contracting moves real world contracting closer to the full
information assumption of efficient contracting theory,
thereby increasing the likelihood that parties select the set of
contract terms that maximize the joint value of the
contract.228

B. Practical Implications
Predictive contracting has practical implications for the
contracting ecosystem, particularly for the transactional
lawyers (both at law firms and in-house) who frequently serve
as the primary drafters of business contracts. Technological
innovation in the legal industry has frequently been
characterized as an existential threat to lawyers. 229 This is a
familiar narrative in a world in which jobs long done by
humans are being automated at a rapid pace. 230 Yet, despite
proposing to automate many tasks traditionally performed by
transactional lawyers, predictive contracting will not make
transactional lawyers obsolete. To the contrary, predictive
227 This example is a contractual application of the Coase Theorem. See
supra note 17.
228 This assumes that both parties have access to predictive contracting
systems. For a discussion of the risks that arise when only one party has
access to predictive contracting, see infra Section III.C.4.
229 See RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE
NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 99–146 (2010); RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S
LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 43–58 (2d ed. 2017).
230 See generally Natalie Kitroeff, Robots Could Replace 1.7 Million
American Truckers in the Next Decade, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 25, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-fi-automated-trucks-labor-20160924
[https://perma.cc/WLL5-NH9R].
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contracting has the potential to make transactional lawyers
more valuable than ever before by providing them with access
to previously unavailable information on the statistical
connections between contract terms and outcomes. This newly
available information will likely significantly change the role
of transactional lawyers.
In his pivotal article in 1984, Ronald Gilson characterized
transactional lawyers as “transaction cost engineers.”231
According to Gilson, transactional lawyers add value to a
transaction by reducing the costs associated with that
transaction by more than the fee they charge. 232 Lawyers
accomplish this goal through the use of contract mechanisms,
such as representations, warranties, and indemnification
provisions.233 Since Gilson’s pioneering work, legal
commentators have proposed additional roles for
transactional
lawyers
including
reputational
intermediaries,234 regulatory compliance experts,235 and
enterprise architects.236 More recently, Elizabeth de Fontenay
has noted that transactional lawyers at large law firms add
value by collecting data on private deal terms that they use to
provide market insights to their clients.237
Predictive contracting will enable two additional roles for
transactional lawyers to complement those discussed above.
231 Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984); see also Lisa Bernstein, The
Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239,
251–52 (1995); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business
Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
232 See Gilson, supra note 231, at 255.
233 See generally id. at 256–93.
234 See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a ThirdParty Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 53, 94 (1986); Karl S.
Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 18–19
(1995); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1739–40 (1998).
235 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional
Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 486, 500 (2007).
236 See George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects,
64 BUS. LAW. 279, 317 (2009).
237 See de Fontenay, supra note 112, at 395–98.
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The first new role is outcome engineer. Similar to Gilson’s
transaction cost engineers who use contractual mechanisms
to reduce transaction costs, outcome engineers will use
predictive contracting to help clients achieve their desired
outcomes. Outcome engineers will accomplish this by helping
their clients understand the likely effects of contract terms on
outcomes as identified by a predictive contracting system. In
addition, outcome engineers will assist their clients in
weighing tradeoffs between expected outcomes. For example,
an outcome engineer could use a predictive contracting system
to identify that Term A typically results in a lower quality of
counterparty performance but also has a lower likelihood of
causing a dispute, whereas Term B results in higher
performance quality but causes more disputes. The outcome
engineer could use this information to help her client balance
performance quality against dispute likelihood. After
discussing the potential effects of terms on outcomes and the
tradeoffs between expected outcomes, an outcome engineer
can design a contract that is tailored to achieve her client’s
desired set of outcomes.
The second new role for transactional lawyers enabled by
predictive contracting is contract innovator. As was discussed
in Section II.A.2, predictive contracting will promote contract
innovation by helping contract drafters understand the
potential effects of new terms on outcomes. These new terms,
however, must still be created by humans. Transactional
lawyers will therefore have a pivotal role to play in creating
innovative terms that can then be used and analyzed by a
predictive contracting system. The generation of new terms
will begin with a creative contract innovator who designs an
initial version of a new term. During the design process, the
innovator can use a predictive contracting system to gain
insights into the potential effects of the new term based on
ontological similarities with existing terms. 238 Once the new
term is put into use in contracts, the innovator can track the
term’s performance using predictive contracting and modify

238

See supra Section III.A.2.
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subsequent versions of the term based on real-world outcome
data.
Along with creating new roles, predictive contracting will
also alter the set of skills that are important for the practice
of transactional law. One of the hallmarks of a valuable
transactional lawyer has traditionally been a substantial
amount of experience and the anecdotal deal knowledge that
comes with that experience. Business lawyers have long
advised their clients based on their prior experiences with
similar transactions. Yet, in the presence of a predictive
contracting system trained on thousands of prior contracts, a
lawyer’s anecdotal knowledge of past deals will become less
valuable. While experience will still be important, a lawyer’s
memory will no longer be needed to serve as a rudimentary
database of deal terms and outcomes. In addition, a lawyer’s
ability to “guesstimate” the effects of terms on outcomes will
not be necessary when a predictive contracting system can
provide concrete statistical evidence of those effects. On the
other hand, skills that cannot be replicated by a predictive
contracting system will become even more valuable. This is
especially true of skills oriented towards human interaction,
including client counseling and negotiation. Furthermore,
creativity and the ability to innovate will be incredibly
valuable as these skills will enable a transactional attorney to
design new terms.
Predictive contracting will also affect the relationship
between law firms and their clients. As de Fontenay discusses,
large law firms provide value to their clients partly through
market knowledge derived from data they collect on private
deal terms.239 Predictive contracting systems, however, will
likely provide more extensive, robust, and granular data on
contract terms than the data that is currently collected by
large law firms. As a result, law firms may lose some of the
advantages that their term databases have traditionally
provided to them. Clients are much better situated to collect
data on contract outcomes because they are the entities that
are directly affected by those outcomes. By making term data

239

See de Fontenay, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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more broadly available and increasing the importance of
outcome data, predictive contracting will likely weaken the
position of law firms relative to their clients.

C. Limitations and Risks
Predictive contracting faces a number of limitations and
risks including: (1) technical constraints, (2) concerns
regarding data privacy and confidentiality, (3) the regulation
of the unauthorized practice of law, and (4) the potential for
exacerbating information inequality. These issues are
addressed in the Sections below.

1. Technical Constraints
Predictive contracting faces a number of technical
constraints related to data sufficiency, representativeness,
bias, and interpretability.
The primary technical constraint that predictive
contracting faces is collecting sufficient data on contract
terms, outcomes, and conditions with which to train a
machine learning model. Many contracting scenarios (like
much of law) are highly complex systems. 240 Models of
complex systems require substantial amounts of data to
generate accurate predictions. Despite developments in
contract management, natural language processing, and
computable contracts, there will still be challenges to contract
data collection. First, some contracting scenarios will have so
many relevant terms, outcomes, and conditions that the
available data set will not be able to support the complexity of
the scenario. As a result, initial applications of predictive

240 See Katz, supra note 22, at 962 (describing legal systems as
“complex adaptive systems with elaborate levels of complexity”). For a
discussion of legal complexity, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal
Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 150 (1995); Peter H.
Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1 (1992); R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation
of Why the Law Can’t Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715
(2000).
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contracting will likely be narrow in scope to reduce complexity
and thereby require less data. As data sets become larger and
more robust, users can expand their scope of analysis to
include a greater number of terms, outcomes, and conditions.
Second, some outcomes may occur so infrequently (such as
“bet the company” litigation) that a model cannot be trained
to predict these outcomes.
Third, some data may be incredibly difficult or even
impossible to collect, such as the effects of relational
contracting.241 This highlights one of the key limitations of
predictive contracting: if a term, condition, or outcome cannot
be represented as machine-interpretable data, it cannot be
analyzed using predictive contracting. Fortunately, many of
these variables can be represented in a predictive contracting
model with proxy variables that are much easier to obtain.
With respect to relational contracting, for example, the
presence of relational contracting can be proxied by a variable,
such as the length of any prior contracting relationship
between the parties. As discussed above, early applications of
predictive contracting will focus on relatively simple
contracting scenarios and will likely not include difficult-toobtain variables such as the effects of relational contracting.
As predictive contracting systems and their associated data
sets improve and start to analyze more complex contracting
scenarios, the ability to identify effective proxies for difficultto-obtain variables will become a key feature of model design.
Another technical concern is whether the contracts in the
training set are representative of future contracts. Machine
241 See Surden, supra note 108, at 683–84 (defining a relational
contract as one in which “the parties are incapable of reducing important
terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations”) (quoting Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1091 (1981)); Surden, supra note 35, at 106–07. For a discussion of
relational contracting and the role of norms and institutions, see generally
Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 (2015); Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).
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learning models struggle at predicting outcomes for scenarios
that differ substantially from their training data. 242 For
example, a contract drafter should not use a predictive
contracting model trained on sales agreements to predict the
cost of drafting a licensing agreement. A predictive
contracting model will produce far more accurate predictions
if the contracting scenarios being analyzed are similar to those
on which the model was trained. Users can help ensure the
representativeness of a predictive contracting model by
periodically updating the training set with new contracts and
using this updated data set to retrain the model.
A predictive contracting model can also produce inaccurate
predictions if the training set is systematically biased. 243 For
example, if a predictive contracting model is trained on a set
of contracts all drafted by the same law firm, and the firm has
an idiosyncratic preference for a particular set of terms, the
model will be biased in favor of these terms. When training a
model, contract drafters should be aware of potential biases in
the training set. In addition, machine learning researchers
are developing methods to debias data sets. 244
Predictive contracting systems will also face challenges
regarding the interpretability of their results. Like other
prediction systems based on machine learning, predictive
contracting systems will not necessarily be able to tell contract
drafters why the identified connections between contract
terms and outcomes exist. While “black box” models are useful
for identifying connections that are otherwise difficult or
impossible to identify, understanding the source of these
242 See Dolin, supra note 82, at 2; Ng, supra note 72, at 30–31; Remus
& Levy, supra note 44, at 511 (using the example of autonomous vehicles
having difficulty driving on roads that contain hazards not contained in
their training sets); Surden, supra note 35, at 105. But see McKamey, supra
note 40, at 52–54.
243 See Surden, supra note 35, at 106.
244 See Tolga Bolukbasi, Kai-Wei Chang, James Zou, Venkatesh
Saligrama & Adam Kalai, Quantifying and Reducing Stereotypes in Word
Embeddings, 2016 ICML Workshop on #Data4Good: Machine Learning in
Social Good Applications, at 43 (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.06121.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UB8W-ZDVK] (developing an algorithm to reduce gender
stereotyping in text data).
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connections is important for contract drafters to make
informed contract design decisions. 245 Contract drafters will
need to use their knowledge and expertise to interpret the
results of predictive contracting models. In addition, machine
learning researchers are developing methods to increase the
interpretability of machine learning models.246

2. Privacy and Confidentiality
Concerns about data privacy and confidentiality have
increased substantially in recent years. Numerous large
companies have had customer data stolen or misused.247
Governments have responded by stepping up scrutiny of how
companies collect, store, and use customer data, most notably
the General Data Protection Regulation in the European
245 See Katz, supra note 22, at 950 n.198 and accompanying text;
Scholz, supra note 156, at 160 (describing how many companies use
machine learning algorithms to “poke around looking for patterns” in data
without understanding why those patterns exist).
246 See Been Kim, Martin Wattenberg, Justin Gilmer, Carrie Cai,
James Wexler, Fernanda Viegas & Rory Sayres, Interpretability Beyond
Feature Attribution: Quantitative Testing with Concept Activation Vectors
(TCAV) 1 (June 7, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/
abs/1711.11279 [https://perma.cc/ARA9-BX8N] (introducing Concept
Activation Vectors, which can be used to assist in the interpretation of
machine learning models).
247 In 2017, Equifax, one of the major consumer credit agencies in the
United States, experienced a massive security breach that compromised the
personal information of tens of millions of Americans. See Tara Siegel
Bernard, Tiffany Hsu, Nicole Perlroth & Ron Lieber, Equifax Says
Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 7,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifaxcyberattack.html [https://perma.cc/W7RM-D97L]. In 2018, Facebook
announced that the data of millions of users had been improperly accessed
by Cambridge Analytica, a political consulting firm associated with the
Trump campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. See Cecilia
Kang & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Says Cambridge Analytica Harvested
Data of Up to 87 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/mark-zuckerberg-testifycongress.html [https://perma.cc/A5QQ-Y575]. The Cambridge Analytica
scandal resulted in Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s founder and CEO, being
called to testify before Congress about Facebook’s data security and privacy
controls. Id.
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Union.248 Predictive contracting, like other technology
systems that use data to predict outcomes, will encounter
privacy challenges related to the collection, storage, and use
of contract data.249 In addition, there will likely be added
complexity due to professional regulations that restrict how
lawyers may share confidential client information. 250
Contract technology companies frequently cite data privacy as
one of their clients’ main concerns.251 For contract technology
companies developing machine learning systems, user privacy
concerns are the main hurdle to pooling contract data from

248 See EUGDPR, https://www.eugdpr.org [https://perma.cc/8WBNXNU7] (“The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). . .[was]
designed to [h]armonize data privacy laws across Europe, [to] protect and
empower all EU citizens data privacy, [and to] [r]eshape the way
organizations across the region approach data privacy.”). Violations of
GDPR can result in potentially serious penalties for offending companies.
See GDPR Key Changes, EUGDPR, https://www.eugdpr.org/theregulation.html [https://perma.cc/4ZW9-6WT7] (noting that under GDPR,
“[o]rganizations in breach of GDPR can be fined up to 4% of annual global
turnover or €20 Million (whichever is greater).”).
249 See Casey & Niblett, supra note 42, at 50–51. For a discussion of the
intersection of privacy law and data collection, see generally Lisa Austin,
Privacy and the Question of Technology, 22 L. & PHIL. 119 (2003); Omer
Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big
Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2012); Omer Tene & Jules
Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 239 (2013); Paul M. Schwartz,
Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623 (2013); PRIVACY,
BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT (Julia
Lane, Victoria Stodden, Stefan Bender & Helen Nissenbaum eds., 2014).
250 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008)
(“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is
permitted by paragraph (b)”); see also de Fontenay, supra note 112, at 428–
30.
251 Interview with Contract Room Representative, in Palo Alto, Cal.,
supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Beagle Representative, supra note
119; Telephone Interview with Contract Assistant Representative, supra
note 111; Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative
(Mar. 6, 2018); Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative,
supra note 60.
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multiple customers to increase the size of training sets.252
Companies that build predictive contracting systems will need
to be highly diligent with respect to how they handle user
data. A security breach or other misuse of user data could
mean the end of an otherwise promising predictive
contracting company.
Privacy also presents a problem for computable contracts,
one of the key sources of contract data for predictive
contracting systems. Due to the peer-to-peer nature of
blockchain systems, the transactions on many computable
contracts platforms are public. For sensitive contracting
scenarios, parties are unlikely to use publicly viewable
computable contracts due to privacy concerns. In response to
this concern, computable contracts companies such as Oasis
Labs are beginning to develop platforms that support
“privacy-preserving” computable contracts.253

3. Unauthorized Practice of Law
A core feature of the regulation of the legal profession is
that non-lawyers may not practice law. 254 If a non-lawyer (or
a company owned or managed by a non-lawyer) renders legal
services, they run the risk of incurring liability for what is
generally referred to as the “unauthorized practice of law”
(“UPL”).255 While originally intended to prevent human nonlawyers from practicing law, UPL regulations have been
applied to legal technology companies owned and operated by
non-lawyers.256 Legal technology commentators have noted
252 Telephone Interview with Beagle Representative, supra note 119;
Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative, supra note
251; Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 60.
253 See Privacy-First Cloud Computing on Blockchain: A Non-Technical
Primer, OASIS LABS, Nov. 2018, https://docsend.com/view/fsdz4hv
[https://perma.cc/F5Z2-YKUY].
254 See e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6125–6133 (2018).
255 Id.
256 In 2017, three New Jersey Supreme Court Committees (Advisory
Committee on Professional Ethics, Committee on Attorney Advertising, and
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law) issued a joint opinion
finding that AVVO, LegalZoom, and Rocket Lawyer were all in violation of
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that UPL regulations could create challenges for the use of
machine learning in the provision of legal services.257
The use of predictive contracting systems could potentially
be limited by UPL regulations. Whether UPL regulations will
apply to predictive contracting will depend in large part on
whether the contract drafter using the predictive contracting
system is a lawyer. The ABA has largely embraced the use of
machine learning technology by lawyers.258 The ABA views
the use of such technology by lawyers similarly to employing
a non-lawyer assistant, which is permissible under UPL
regulations.259 This includes legal technology provided to a
lawyer by a third-party company owned and operated by nonlawyers.260 As a result, the use of predictive contracting
systems by contract drafters who are lawyers will likely be
permissible under UPL regulations. The permissibility of nonlawyer contract drafters using predictive contracting, on the
other hand, is much less clear. The general view has been that
a company owned and operated by non-lawyers violates UPL
regulations by providing legal services via a technology
system.261 A recent court case, however, has called into
question whether services provided by a technology system
qualify as practicing law. In Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom, LLP, the Second Circuit stated that “an

UPL regulations (AVVO was found to offer an impermissible referral
service, whereas LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer were found to be
unregistered with the New Jersey Supreme Court). See N.J. Advisory
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, ACPE Joint Opinion 732, at 8 (June 21, 2017),
https://www.themodernfirm.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ACPE-732Avvo-LegalZoom-Rocket-Lawyer-6.21.17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2NEQUNUW].
257 See Betts & Jaep, supra note 160, at 232; Dolin, supra note 82, at 3;
McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 40, at 3059–64; Larry E. Ribstein, The Death
of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 807–08 (2010); Ray Worthy Campbell,
Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 45–51 (2012).
258 See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 40, at 3059–61.
259 Id. at 3060.
260 Id. at 3060–61 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 cmt.
3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)).
261 Id. at 3061–64.
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individual who . . . undertakes tasks that could otherwise be
performed entirely by a machine cannot be said to engage in
the practice of law.” 262 This reasoning suggests that the use of
a technology system such as predictive contracting may not
qualify as practicing law even if the individuals using the
system are non-lawyers.

4. Information Inequality
Predictive contracting provides contract drafters with
better information than they would otherwise have access to
under traditional contracting. This information enables
contract drafters to craft more effective contracts that
increase the joint value generated by a transaction.263 The
analysis of predictive contracting thus far, however, has
assumed that all parties to a contract have access to predictive
contracting systems. If, on the other hand, only one party has
access to predictive contracting, that party will have a
substantial information advantage during the negotiation and
design of the contract. When one party has a large information
advantage, that party tends to use its advantage to extract
value from its counterparty via potentially inefficient but
allocatively advantageous terms. 264 In the context of businessto-business contracting, it is reasonable to assume that as
predictive contracting systems demonstrate their value in the
market, more businesses will start to use such systems,
thereby decreasing the likelihood that a party will have an
information advantage relative to its counterparty. This
assumption cannot be made, however, in the context of
business-to-consumer contracting. There is a large body of
literature on consumer contracts that highlights the
information and bargaining power disparity between

262 Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom L.L.P., 620 F. App’x.
37, 45 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that document review did not per se meet
North Carolina’s definition of practicing law). This case is the first to use
this reasoning.
263 See supra Section III.A.6.
264 See supra Section III.A.6.

2019.2_WILLIAMS_FINAL

694

4/27/2019 4:19 AM

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

businesses and consumers. 265 Unlike businesses, consumers
are highly unlikely to have access to predictive contracting
systems. As a result, predictive contracting has the potential
to exacerbate the information inequality that already exists in
the consumer contracting context. For example, a business
could use a predictive contracting system to identify the set of
contract terms that best advantage the business at the
expense of the consumer.266 The potential effects of predictive
contracting on consumer contracts will need to be closely
monitored.267

IV. CONCLUSION
This Article examined how contract drafters can use data
on contract outcomes to inform contract design. Building on
recent developments in contract data collection and analysis,
the Article proposed predictive contracting, a new method of
contracting in which contract drafters can design contracts
using a technology system that helps predict the connections
between contract terms and outcomes. The Article then
discussed the theoretical and practical implications of
predictive contracting. On a theoretical level, predictive
contracting can lead to greater customization, increased
innovation, more complete contract design, more effective
balancing of front-end and back-end costs, better risk
assessment and allocation, and more accurate term pricing for
negotiation. On a practical level, predictive contracting has
the potential to significantly alter the role of transactional
See supra note 74.
But see G. Marcus Cole, Rational Consumer Ignorance: When and
Why Consumers Should Agree to Form Contracts Without Even Reading
Them, 11 J.L., ECON. & POL’Y 413, 413–16 (2015) (arguing that consumer
contracts in competitive markets should be consumer-favorable due to
competition between businesses with respect to contract terms. In less
competitive markets, however, businesses with monopoly or oligopoly
market positions are more likely to include terms harmful to consumers).
267 Consumer protection organizations, such as CLAUDETTE, are
starting to use machine learning to identify unlawful and/or harmful terms
in consumer contracts. See About, CLAUDETTE, http://claudette.eui.
eu/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/EM8Z-WZXG].
265
266
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lawyers by providing them with access to previously
unavailable information on the statistical connections
between contract terms and outcomes. The Article also
discussed a number of risks and limitations faced by
predictive contracting, including technical constraints,
concerns regarding data privacy and confidentiality, the
regulation of the unauthorized practice of law, and the
potential for exacerbating information inequality.
Further research is required to more fully develop
predictive contracting. The first step is to build a working
prototype of a predictive contracting system using real-world
contract data. In addition to developing a prototype, future
research should examine how computable contracts can best
be used as mechanisms for contract data collection. Of the
three sources of contract data discussed in this Article,
computable contracts have the greatest potential to collect
machine-readable contract data at scale. While computable
contracts are still in a nascent stage of development,
blockchain companies, such as Ethereum, are starting to push
computable contracts towards mainstream use. Designing
computable contracting systems with data collection in mind
is critical for the long-term success of predictive contracting.
Lastly, subsequent research should explore the risks posed by
predictive contracting, particularly the potential for
exacerbating information inequality between asymmetrically
situated parties such as in consumer contracting.

